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0 Executive Summary  
0.1 Introduction and overview 
The scientific world is profoundly affected by the changes taking place in the wider society of which it 
forms an essential part.  Such is the scope and pace of the changes to contemporary society – driven 
by globalisation, the rise of new communications technologies, new economic competitors, and the 
collapse of traditional social structures – that science appears to face a crisis.  The pace of change 
appears to have encouraged society to respond by blocking potential avenues for scientific 
developments, in a range of famous cases including BSE, nuclear power and GM food.  Science and 
scientists depend on social approval for the freedom to carry out their experiments – their so-called 
licence to practice.  Rising societal resistance to scientific developments has led to increasing calls for 
scientists to engage more with diverse public actors earlier in their discovery process, to create a 
fertile and welcoming environment for science inventions. 
This problem has been slowly emerging in recent decades.  In the 1980s, a movement known as 
‗Public Understanding of Science‘ emerged, the idea being that the public would be more supportive of 
scientists if they better understood the issues behind the science.  A series of deep-seated crises gave 
lie to the idea that the problem was a deficit in ‗public‘ understanding: sometimes the public 
understood but chose to reject scientists‘ interpretations.  In the late 1990s, the idea of public 
engagement emerged, based on the idea that science‘s progressive potential requires broad public 
acceptance, which can no longer be assumed to be automatic.  Instead, engagement allows the public 
to take a sense of ownership of science, to engage with issues, and ultimately, and collectively, to 
influence the direction of travel of scientific inquiry and progress. 
In this working paper, we define public engagement by scientists as the activities where scientists 
meet with publics and have discussions which shape the practice of science.  In part, public 
engagement differs from public understanding in that in engagement, there is two-way communication 
between scientists and publics.  In some cases, publics even might evaluate or judge what those 
scientists have to say to some wider public end, such as in ethical debates around what is permissible 
in life science research.  This working paper asks the question whether the increasing amount of 
activity makes a difference to improving the environment for science, and what certainty we might 
have whether further increasing engagement would further improve the UK‘s scientific environment.  
This paper reviews the evidence underlying this idea of public engagement, to better model the 
relationships between scientists and publics shaping science‘s special societal function. 
0.2 The four external pressures on public engagement with the sciences 
The review highlights four main societal changes which have affected the environment within which 
science operates, and which have increased the importance of engagement by scientists with a 
variety of publics. 
 The loss of expertise and authority of scientists, alongside a series of rejection of expert advice by 
suspicious publics e.g. Bovine Somatotrophin, GM Food, 
 A change in the nature of knowledge production, with increasing interaction and networking 
between partners within potentially closed ‗innovation networks‘, 
 Improved communications and a proliferation of sources of information, meaning scientists are in 
an increasingly competitive global ‗marketplace of ideas‘, and  
 The democratic deficit: the challenge to the mass-party system, with the emergence of single issue 
pressure groups and closed, populist movements. 
The first driver has been that scientists have certainly in recent years seen the amount of deference 
they receive from the public eroded in a series of crises which have highlighted growing public 
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scepticism towards the impartiality and fairness of scientific pronouncements.  Despite this, scientists 
remain broadly trusted as the best placed to interpret and explain the impacts of their discoveries on 
society, and are certainly far more trusted than journalists, civil servants or politicians.  There is strong 
concern in two areas: on the one hand, scientists exercise discretion in the scientific process, and 
there are public concerns that scientists are taking ethical decisions without due consideration of 
prevailing moral codes.  On the other, there is a resigned disenchantment amongst publics that their 
engagement with scientists appears to have little tangible impact on the decisions affecting science 
policy which frame science‘s societal impacts.  The first problem for science is how to allow the public 
to exercise some manner of accountability over scientific decision-taking, without science and 
scientists becoming a lightening rod for public dissatisfaction given a failure to take consultations 
seriously and with political disenchantment more generally. 
The second pressure on scientists has come through an increasing recognition of the interactive 
nature of knowledge production process.  Knowledge creation was long regarded as a linear pipeline, 
where governments funded universities to undertake basic science, which was applied through 
research laboratories and institutes, and implemented into innovative products in firms.  This model 
creates a neat division of labour, between the impartial scientist, the ingenious engineer and the 
innovative entrepreneur yet fails to recognise that knowledge creation almost never follows a simple or 
straightforward route.  In attempting to solve a corporate or public problem, the problem-solver will 
draw on a range of knowledges from a range of sources.  What firms, laboratories and universities are 
all concerned with is ensuring that they have the right knowledges in the right forms so that it can be 
accessed and productively applied at the most effective point in the problem-solving process.  But at 
the same time, this risks creating closed cliques between scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs 
which exclude wider publics, and which create very little public accountability around decisions which 
can profoundly change national ethical and moral landscapes. 
The third pressure on scientists has come through the fact that they are increasingly competing with 
all manner of outlets offering their own versions of knowledge, facts, opinions and interpretations.  
Given that scientists have lost some of their public deference, and that other types of knowledge 
producer are increasingly accepted as equally or equivalently having legitimate voices, this means that 
debates about science often generate ‗more heat than light‘.  Scientists may be forced to compromise 
their basic principles to be able to sell their knowledge in the global market-place of ideas, meeting 
media outlets demand for certain, quick answers at odds with the slow back-and-forth of the 
contemporary scientific process.  Yet, failing to make these compromises raises the spectre of 
increasing funding and legitimacy being passed to bodies such as lobbyists and pressure groups who 
lack a commitment to science‘s steady and step-wise creation of knowledge. 
The final pressure on scientists arises from the consequences of a crisis in the legitimacy of political 
institutions more generally.  Contemporary societal problems are increasingly complex, and producing 
effective solutions requires mobilising coalitions of partners who between them have the knowledge, 
the resources and the legitimacy to deliver effective and well-thought through solutions.  Politicians are 
therefore increasingly responsive to groups which participate in these coalitions, and correspondingly 
less so to traditional power structures such as unions and political parties.  Legitimacy is increasingly 
dependent on the possession of knowledge or financial resources to contribute to solutions, which 
places science in something of a quandary.  Should scientists exploit their knowledge through 
participation in elite decision-making structures, or should they instead try to inculcate wider society 
with the scientific norms and behaviours that underpin progressive societies more generally? 
0.3 Making sense of the mess: five stylised facts about public engagement. 
Public engagement is an important means to resolve these various tensions.  But the fact that there 
are so many pressures and tensions simultaneously means that there needs to be a degree of caution 
in proposing more engagement between scientists and publics.  The review highlights a number of 
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stylised facts1 emerging from the literature which both shape the way engagement should be 
understood, but also frame what it can be expected to achieve in practice.   
Firstly, there is no reasonable prospect of encouraging engagement which significantly impinges on 
scientists‘ autonomy to pursue interesting avenues.  Some writers have evoked a mirage of a kind of 
plebiscitary control over science, where every proposal is voted on by ‗the public‘.  What has currently 
been achieved with public engagement is a set of interesting experiments that suggest (but do not 
conclusively prove) that a little more engagement, of the sort already being undertaken, but more 
effectively organised, can help to secure science‘s ‗licence to practice‘ in these increasingly sceptical 
times. 
Secondly, there is a limit to the amount of engagement which scientists can sensibly undertake, 
because of the trade-off for scientists between engaging with the public thereby securing long-term 
autonomy, as against the need to undertake science and immediately answer pressing questions.  In 
some – but not all – cases it may be possible to develop more engaged research methodologies.  But 
different types of engagement are appropriate to different kinds of situation, and there is no simple 
one-sized fits all solution to the engagement issue. 
Thirdly, and paradoxically, new types of free-standing engagement institution (such as consultations) 
are seldom the best response to this putative engagement deficit.  The purpose of engagement is to 
equip the public to form an informed opinion over science and potentially to use that informed opinion 
to influence the societal guidance of science.  This means that effective engagement must also be 
influential, and the risk of with new, free-standing bodies is that they are not connected to the 
institutions which actually take those decisions, nor are those institutions skilled in knowing how to 
take forward the results of engagement in practice. 
Fourthly, although there is no ideal type of engagement arena2, some features of engagement arenas 
are unambiguously beneficial and increase the effectiveness of engagement.  Clarity around the 
definition of who can participate, what are the rules of participation, and the expected influences and 
learning outcomes, all improve the quality of engagement institutions.  Engagement arenas have a 
dual role – they allow publics and scientists to discuss scientific issues, but they also help publics and 
scientists to become better at discussing those issues.  The most effective engagement arenas are 
the ones which emphasise and accentuate that learning process. 
Finally, engagement only really works if the outcomes of engagement have an influence.  And is it not 
the publics or scientists who will usually be able to determine that, rather it is public policy-makers.  In 
the UK, there is a rather centralised governance structure in which national government decisions 
have a primacy.  Scientific engagement therefore needs to feed into the public policy process.  But the 
problem is that politicians usually only consult with publics around scientifically contentious areas, 
where there is little opportunity for rational deliberative processes.  Mainstreaming public engagement 
means creating far more engagement arenas (they certainly exist, for example around Alzheimer‘s 
care) that can routinely influence public policy away from the pressures of urgency, conflict and crisis, 
where consultation and engagement usually occurs. 
0.4 Towards a model of the public engagement system 
To make sense of this complexity, the review develops a model of how public engagement contributes 
to securing scientific autonomy through increasing public accountability.  Scientists and publics 
interact in various different ways, which can be distinguished between the differing levels of intensity 
                                                   
1
 A stylised fact is a simplified presentation of an empirical finding.  They are used in the social sciences as a means of 
generalising very specialised findings and allowing findings from different disciplines to contribute to the development of a 
more sophisticated argument. 
2
 We here use the idea of an engagement arena as a generic definition for any place where scientists and publics meet and 
exchange ideas about scientific knowledge.  This might be a real place such as a science café, it might be virtual (e.g. a 
consultative web-site) or it might even be where publics judge proposals or submissions from scientists for funding grants. 
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of that interaction, ranging from traditional dissemination activities (least interaction/ intensity) to 
innovative co-governance of research programmes and priorities by publics and users (most intense).  
The model notes that engagement is burdensome, but experiencing successful interaction makes 
more intense interaction less burdensome.  Thus, generally speaking, good engagement breeds more 
engagement, by making more-intensive engagement more appropriate, all other things being equal. 
The model distinguishes four archetypes of engagement intensity, and highlights the importance of 
‗demand pull‘ for increasing engagement activity.  The presence of activity engages the unengaged 
public, whilst effective engagement producing outcomes encourages more intensive interactions.  
Lower overall levels of public engagement can therefore be understood as the engagement system 
being in a lower-engagement equilibrium rather than the fault of one particular group within that overall 
system. 
 
Figure 1 The scientist engagement system: multi-level science-society relationships 
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Good interventions… 
… increase both the numbers of arenas, as well as supporting experiments in novel kinds of 
engagement. 
… build on existing well-functioning relationships and use them as the basis for developing novel 
engagement capacities.   
… recruit people to activities by giving them an inspirational vision of where engagement might lead 
(them). 
… create demand for the output of engagement, posing taxing problems and questions which 
engagement can answer. 
… support local engagements whilst connecting it up to external peer support and bringing wider 
recognition. 
… support the social lives of the communities who engage, valuing those communities as well as the 
engagement outcomes they bring. 
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1 The challenges for 21st Century Science 
1.1 Introduction and overview 
What value does science bring to society?  On the one hand, that questions lies in the same class as 
―what have the Romans ever done for us?‖ , because science, technology and innovation are 
profoundly fundamental to contemporary society in a way that even one century ago was not true.  But 
on the other hand, it is a question that is increasingly being asked, and in an age of global credit crisis,  
it comes also with the coda, ―and why should we pay for it?‖.  To those who work in the science 
sphere, the question needs no answer: science is the bedrock of progress, based on the cumulative 
accretion of facts over the course of generations providing better understandings of the world (Ravetz, 
1999).  But to others, science and scientific progress raises new kinds of fears, from atomic 
destruction in the 1950s, ‗mad cow disease‘ in the 1980s, or the ‗Frankenstein Foods‘ of the 1990s. 
Just as science is vital to contemporary society, so is societal support vital for the successful pursuit of 
science.  In the absence of societal support, an environment of fear may emerge, in which societies 
restrict and burden science to deal with their uncertainties and worries.  Societal support cannot be 
taken for granted, because science does raise ethical and moral dilemmas.  Scientists are compelled 
in their daily lives to continually and incrementally resolve ethical tensions and to take moral 
standpoints.  Societal support is contingent on society in some way being able to influence, control or 
regulate the way scientists make their ethical judgements.  The challenge is therefore in allowing 
society to have its ‗say‘ over science‘s ethical dimensions, without unnecessarily burdening scientists 
and reducing their capacity to make positive impacts. 
Since the 1970s, there has been an appreciation amongst scientists of the importance of building a 
dialogue with public groups to ensure a supportive public environment.  Initially, the emphasis lay on 
promoting public understanding of science, the idea being that if publics better understood science 
discoveries, then they would become more supportive of science as a whole.  More recently, the 
emphasis has shifted to the idea of ‗engagement‘, allowing the public the opportunity to interact with 
science, and potentially to bring their own perspectives into the way that scientific discoveries flow into 
and shape our contemporary world.  How then to ensure that the public can retain their connections 
to, interest in and influence over science in a world where science is becoming apparently increasingly 
esoteric, specialist and obscure? 
Alongside this, there are a set of ―grand challenges‖, such as energy security, better healthcare and 
access to water for all, to which society is looking to science to provide effective solutions.  A failure to 
address these wider socio-economic problems may undermine the scientific approach‘s claims to be 
the guarantor of progress, allowing long-standing scepticisms over sciences ideas‘ values to re-
emerge (cf. 2.2.2).  A second key challenge for 21st century science is thus to exploit its practical 
opportunities – and demonstrate the continuing value of progress and dispassionate inquiry – without 
compromising on the qualities which make it the basis for developing generalised solutions and a 
brighter future:- 
―how to combine commitment with neutrality, scientific objectivity with involvement in society 
problems and hence in social conflicts, and in the final analysis, independence with 
participation‖ (CERI, 1982, p.44). 
It is impossible to dissociate the increasing phenomenon of public engagement in science from these 
dual pressures, being democratically accountable and demonstrating utility.  This literature review 
explores how these two pressures have become intertwined, changing societal pressures on science, 
and increasing engagement of science with publics.  On the one hand, engagement embodies an 
idealist commitment to a particular set of democratic values in science, but on the other hand 
engagement forms part of a pragmatic approach to secure acquiescence by the public to 
contemporary scientific inquiry.  This tension provides our backdrop in this working paper in seeking to 
illuminate wider changes to the science system in the UK in recent years, and provide the basis for 
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understanding how to renew the public covenant, thereby ensuring the most propitious conditions for 
science and scientists. 
Against this tense background, we firstly explore in some more detail the boundary conditions and 
drivers within wider society as a whole which frame these changes towards ‗post-normal science‘.  
The review then turns to produce some key stylised facts about the nature of these changes, with a 
greater degree of nuance than high-level, broad-brush narratives of change often provide .  The report 
then turns to consider a systematic framework for understanding these changes, and offers a model 
for understanding the key issue of why – despite a huge amount of engagement work undertaken by 
scientists - there remains relatively little of the more intense forms of engagement which might serve 
to fulfil public demands for appropriate influence over scientific trajectories. 
1.2 Licence to practice and the science-society covenant 
A starting point for this review is the fact that continued political and public support for the funding of 
science is likely to be primarily dependent on the extent to which ‗science‘ is able to gain credit for 
contributing to solutions to societal problems, rather than society valuing sciences contribution to 
democracy in the abstract.  This tension lies at the heart of the business of science, because science 
attempts to say authoritatively ―what happens‖ generally on the basis of ―what has happened‖ on 
particular occasions.  Scientific method struggles to reconcile the practical and the particular 
(experimental data) with the abstract and the universal (scientific theory) (Latour, 1987).  Scientists 
use their imagination and metaphorical thinking to construct, test, and refine or reject their theories. 
There are difficulties in translating knowledge from controlled ‗laboratories‘ into the messy and chaotic 
‗real world‘ and in being able to talk decisively about outcomes in particular situations (Ravetz, 1999; 
Gregory, 2001).  To facilitate this, scientists have developed sets of rules, norms and processes which 
dictate how scientists can use their scientific imagination to produce reasonable theories (Hulme & 
Ravetz, 2009), with which publics are not always acquainted. 
Under such circumstances, the public might question scientists unable to authoritatively answer their 
questions concerning how particular novel developments might affect them personally or society at 
large.  In the UK in particular, it is clear there are long memories in Government and Parliament of the 
debacle surrounding the BSE crisis and the attempted introduction of GM foods in the late 1990s (cf. 
S&TC, 1999; Wilsdon et al., 2006), whilst at the European scale, conflicts around Bovine 
Somatotrophin, which also had a trade dimension, remain salient in considering scientific regulation.  
The post-mortem into the GM debacle concluded a need for greater public inclusion in scientific 
decision-making to address resistance to new technologies and sciences (STSC 1999).  In its wake, 
the UK government has placed much emphasis on using science in government policy-making, 
funding both scientists and umbrella organisations to communicate more effectively with the public 
(SCST 2000; STSC 2002). 
What is at issue here is what Jackson et al. (2005) term science‘s societal ―licence to practice‖.  As 
well as governments‘ direct financial contributions in science, the regulatory and accountability 
environments also influence what science can achieve.  Direct regulatory environments are 
restrictions which governments may place blocking particular technological developments, for 
example around fertility treatments, embryo research, cloning or the release of organisms into the 
environment.  Indirect accountability requirements are reporting requirements which governments 
impose on scientists such as ethics committees, impact statements, and assessment returns. This 
burdening of scientists gives reassurance that they responsibly exercise their privileges. 
The challenge for 21st century science can be conceived of as a revocation of its ―licence to practice‖.  
If science-society conflicts are not amicably resolved, this may slow down social and economic 
progress (Wilsdon et al., 2006).  Contentious scientific areas may be blocked, or scientists burdened 
with all kinds of accountability regulations, slowly throttling the creativity and autonomy necessary to 
knowledge creation (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003).  Renewing the societal covenant is vital to ensure that 
propitious conditions for science – both actively in terms of adequate funding but passively through 
streamlined regulation – allow science to realise its societal contributions. 
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But the challenge is not merely to better explain increasingly complicated technological fixes to an 
increasingly distant group of societal actors, the so-called ‗deficit model‘ of public understanding 
(Wilsdon et al., 2006).  Societal actors themselves question science‘s role in society, partly driven by 
broader societal changes as well as changes intrinsic to science (such as its increasing complexity).  
These external changes occur in political culture from mass, consensus-seeking parties towards 
smaller, more confrontational, single issue groups.  The changing nature of knowledge production has 
created a proliferation of specialists and experts who question scientists‘ approaches and findings, 
creating a challenging, frightening and demoralising environment for scientists (Durodié, 2003).  
―Scientific communication: circa 1600: discussions with the public, according to one prominent 
researcher, are little better than listening to the ―maunderings of a babbling hag‖. So said William 
Gilbert, a pioneer of research into electricity and magnetism.‖ (Nature, 2004, p. 883). 
One key issue for this review is the definition of scientist to be used here.  As the surrounding 
documentation for this report makes clear, a significant proportion of the UK population have 
employment making use of science.  In this working paper, we – for reasons that will become clear – 
limit our definition of ‗scientists‘ to those involved in ‗normal science‘ – knowledge production using 
demonstrably impartial methods rooted in an accepted theoretical paradigm, open to external blind 
review and responsive to critique.  The question lies of where are the boundaries to the ‗set of all 
scientists‘. With academic scientists, the issue is clearer: we stress that we take here a Germanic 
perspective of scientists to include all those disciplines following a cognate method, including the arts 
and social sciences3.  Even around universities and academic scientists, there are those involved in 
advocacy, policy development/ advice and administration as opposed to knowledge creation. 
The issue becomes more unclear within business, particularly in small and medium sized enterprises 
where their small size may necessitate a blurring of roles.  In a large business, R&D activities may be 
distinctive, located in laboratories .  Nevertheless, given the importance of public regulation for the 
business of science, many firms also employ scientists with a strong understanding of the issues in 
advocacy or lobbying roles.  Recognising these shades of involvement in ‗normal science‘, we 
therefore restrict scientists as those principally involved in creating new knowledge rather than its 
advocacy in the public policy process (which we will later see can be a very important role)4.   
We therefore exclude those involved in activities which use science, including teachers, data 
gatherers, technicians, evaluators, patent administrators and routine software development, except 
where they are involved in research, development and innovation projects (OECD, 2003, Elam & 
Bertilsson, 2003).  However, this group (teachers etc.) are science-users, and have critical roles to 
play in public engagement, and can be considered as the ‗cognate public‘ or ‗citizen scientists‘ (cf. 
2.3.3).  This distinction is activity- rather than individual-based.  A science schoolteacher undertaking a 
M.Ed. will temporarily become in this definition – in the field of pedagogical research – a scientist.  
Unless otherwise specified (a distinction of primary importance in 2.1), all references to scientists here 
include all those involved in the production of new knowledge in the public, private and not-for-profit 
sectors conforming to norms of openness, review and critique. 
                                                   
3
 A justification for which can be developed as follows: philosophy of science and technology is clearly an ‗arts‘ subject, but  
few would dispute that it has played a substantive role in developing understanding of scientific approaches and helping 
the reflective process of the definition of what is science.  A similar argument can be developed for science and 
technology studies – which unlike philosophy has no cognate theoretical links via logic with mathematics (although may 
draw on numerical approaches such as bibliometrics) – and which is strongly rooted in sociology.  From that point, it is 
unreasonable to exclude other humanities and social science disciplines from being included as sciences in terms of the 
production of knowledge. 
4
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a think-tank of 30 advanced economies, has placed a great 
deal of effort into developing standardised methodologies for classifying and counting inputs and activities in science, 
technology and innovation.  These are codified in a handbook called the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2003).  What we are 
primarily concerned with is basic research, applied research and knowledge development.  Our exclusions are drawn 
from tasks excluded from research and experimental development (cf. OECD, 2003, p. 31-32). 
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1.3 About this review 
This review seeks to better understand the new environment for science, and in particular to 
understand what role – if any – science communication can play in re-affirming science‘s licence to 
practice, creating the most conducive environment for the pursuit of science which supports societal 
development.  Nevertheless, this is a critical review of public engagement, and we would bridle at 
being described as Durodié (2003) might, as self-elevating new experts, or as Wellcome (2002) term 
it, part of a ‗public engagement industry‘.  We begin from Healey (2005), that there have been some 
impressive and exciting experiments in public engagement, but talk of a new paradigm of engaged 
science can lead to a bald narrative which lacks an understanding of degrees of change.  In this 
working paper, we attempt to nuance this debate by linking the rise of public engagement to four 
external societal changes which have changed the terms of the debates which influence science. 
The preceding paragraph sets out precisely the challenge of any such review of public engagement, 
which is a mismatch between the levels of the debate.  On the one hand, some micro-scale 
experiments in public engagement have – as Durodié rightly points out (2003) – been carried out by 
researchers as much interested in understanding how engagement can succeed as its wider merit.  
This is not to say engagement does not warrant scientific study, yet it is impossible to prove on the 
basis of those small-scale experiments more generalised benefits from public engagement by science.  
In this report, therefore, we develop an argument, based on a set of stylised facts at a range of 
different scales of aggregation, which are suggestive, rather than demonstrative or convincing, of the 
net merits of scientific engagement. 
In a small review, it is impossible to do justice to all the literature covering a plethora of small 
experiments.  To date, there has been nothing as systematic as a Cochrane review of public 
engagement: where possible, we have tried to draw upon aggregated analyses and reviews, but some 
of the most interesting and wide-ranging of these have been political in nature, in a number of 
Inquiries from the UK Parliamentary House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, and the 
Commons Science and Technology Committee, supported by the Parliamentary Office for Science 
and Technology.  Alongside this, there have been final reports from two EU research projects, OPUS 
and STAGE, each of which integrated around six national case studies of public engagement in 
deriving their findings, and are more general than the scientific papers.  
We have also reviewed findings from the ‗scientific‘ literature, and in this context, we use scientist in its 
German derivation as academic sense (cf. 1.2, footnote 1).  Arguably more interesting than the 
findings themselves is the finding that it is a highly disputed terrain.  We have found two 
‗correspondences‘ – Durodié/ Jackson et al., and Collins & Evans/ Win, Rip & Jasanoff, in the Critical 
review of international social and political philosophy (2003/5) and Social studies of science 
respectively (2005) (cf. Durant, 2008) – which clarify the key contours of the disputes between various 
perspectives and the main dividing lines in the arguments.  There have also been a number of 
quantitative reviews of public attitudes to science and technology, and in this report we have used the 
National Science Foundation (2002), Eurobarometer (2005), Office for Science and Technology 
(2005) and People Science & Policy/ TNS (2008) as indicative of societal attitudes.  Finally, we have 
used a number of grey documents from Medical Charities (Wellcome) and think-tanks (Demos) which 
report primarily at the level of argument and anecdote rather than presenting novel original 
experiments and analysis. 
Given the partial, fragmented and diverse nature of the evidence used in this report, it is impossible to 
prove with any scientific degree of certainty the value to public science of engagement.  Nevertheless, 
from the review, and from the remaining debates and controversies, it becomes possible to see a 
pathway forward.  Given that the evidence is persuasive of the potential value of more engagement, 
but sceptical about the idea of comprehensive engagement, this suggests that what is necessary is 
progress along the spectrum from ‗normal‘ to ‗engaged‘ science.  These arguments are drawn 
together in the chapters three and four, to set out a group of inferences which can be drawn for 
practical use with a fair degree of certainty, rather than intrinsic truths about engagement and science. 
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2 Four external pressures on public engagement with the 
sciences 
The first chapter noted how that in recent years, thinking around scientific communications had moved 
beyond the deficit model towards conceptualising how society could interact with, and potentially even 
influence, science.  Effective engagement beyond the deficit model needs therefore to take account of 
both these extrinsic changes in society, as well as intrinsic changes in science, and it is to that task 
that this literature review is addressed.  The intrinsic changes are well-understood around the need to 
communicate increasingly complicated technology developments towards lay communities (SCST, 
2000).  We highlight four broad societal changes which have had particular impacts on the willingness 
of the public to engage with science.  These require further examination to understand what is 
necessary to renew the science-society covenant, securing an effective and productive environment 
for scientists:- 
 The loss of expertise and authority of scientists, alongside a series of rejection of expert advice by 
suspicious publics e.g. Bovine Somatotrophin, GM Food. 
 A change in the nature of knowledge production, with increasing interaction and networking 
between partners within potentially closed ‗innovation networks‘ 
 Improved communications and a proliferation of sources of information, placing scientists in an 
increasingly competitive global ‗marketplace of ideas‘ 
 The democratic deficit and the challenge to the mass-party system, with the emergence of single 
issue pressure groups and closed, populist movements. 
2.1 A crisis in authority and expertise in a number of scientific crises 
2.1.1 The loss of expertise and authority 
The first main external driver is a significant shift in public trust, and in particular public willingness to 
defer to expertise.  This is by no means exclusive to science: governments have also experienced the 
democratic deficit (cf. 2.4).  Stein (2003) places this problem in the UK in the context of a society with 
a strong degree of secularisation, and a rising trend towards scepticism rooted in a naïve post-modern 
relativism.  Durodié (2003) argues that post-modern scepticism led publics to reject the idea of facts 
and truth, and to consider scientific findings similar to opinions, prejudices, beliefs and intuition.  Elam 
and Bertilsson (2003) argue that the Enlightenment Model, whereby only the scientist could truly be a 
citizen, is being replaced with a post-modern model where everyone has rights to comment on and to 
shape scientific practise and activity. 
This is often framed as a ―crisis of trust‖ for science, the passing of an age where the ―man in a white 
coat‖ was uncritically respected, affording them a special societal position (SCST, 2001).  Despite this 
special position, science and scientists have repeatedly disappointed when asked to meet public 
desires for self-assured answers to complex problems which might deviate significantly from the 
laboratory conditions from where knowledges were created.  The public apparently feel excluded from 
participation and dialogue processes around the implications of science for society (POST, 2002). 
When they do participate, they are disappointed when their participation lacks impact either shaping 
science or policy (POST, 2009). 
However, this bold narrative hides a more nuanced picture.  The number of people who are actively 
engaged with scientific issues is relatively low, US data from 2002 described 10% as actively attentive, 
45% as passively interested and 45% uninterested in science issues.  Likewise, the OST and 
Wellcome Trust (2000) clustered their respondents into six groups in terms of their attitudes 
(receptiveness) towards science communications.  The report distinguished ‗confident believers‘ 
(17%), ‗supporters‘ (20%), ‗technophiles‘ (17%), ‗concerned‘ (17%), ‗not sure‘ (13%), and ‗not for me‘ 
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(15%).  The relatively small sample size does not undermine the significance of the fact that – together 
with National Science Foundation survey (200) – publics are very heterogeneous in terms of their 
interest in and support for science as a driver of societal change.   People Science & Policy/ TNS 
(2008) offered five clusters, ‗confident‘ (21%), ‗sceptical believers‘ (14%), ‗less confident‘ (25%), 
‗distrustful‘ (17%)5 and ‗indifferent‘ (22%).  With one-in-six of this sample distrustful, it is therefore 
perhaps not reasonable to claim a general crisis of trust. 
2.1.2 Evidence on public trust of science and scientists  
Indifference and a lack of confidence is not the same as saying that the public do not trust scientists or 
there has been a loss of deference and trust to scientists.  Eurobarometer undertook a special survey 
in 20056 to gauge public receptiveness to science, and the results – both from the UK and EU as a 
whole – did not bear this general story.  There was unanimity that the class of person which the public 
found best qualified to talk about societal impacts of science and technology was ―scientists working in 
government laboratories and the university‖.  52% of respondents found that group trustworthy, in 
comparison to 32% for TV journalists, 28% for industrial scientists and 25% for newspaper journalists 
(see table 1 below).  In the UK, 43% of those interviewed felt that public scientists were the best 
placed to talk about the impacts of science and technology on society.  There is clearly a difference in 
the way that industrial scientists are understood in terms of their qualifications and legitimacy to 
explain societal impacts of science and technology.  
Table 1- Public attitudes on legitimacy to explain S&T societal impacts (selected, EU) 
Response % Yes 
Scientists in university or government laboratory 52% 
TV journalists 32% 
Scientists working in industrial laboratory  28% 
Newspaper journalists 25% 
Medical doctors 23% 
Environmental protection associations 21% 
Writers and intellectuals 10% 
Industries 6% 
Politicians 5% 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2005 
This is the one area in the evidence surveyed which highlights any differences between corporate and 
public scientists in terms of public engagement.  The first, and Eurobarometer is quite explicit about 
this, is that the public tends to be more sceptical about the capacity of business scientists to explain 
their research in comparison to the public sector (regardless of whether that scepticism is well 
founded).   Twice as many people found public scientists were well-qualified to explain the societal 
impacts of science and technology in comparison with four ‗private sector‘ groups, namely medical 
doctors, TV & print journalists, and industrial scientists.  This suggests that that the image of the public 
scientist as an independent authority figure remains untarnished in comparison to other groups. 
The second issue was that respondents did make a clear distinction between different scientist roles 
within firms.  The distinction between industrial scientists and the voice of industry is made quite 
                                                   
5
 ―The group was defined by their lack of trust in Government and authority generally. They were considerably younger than 
the general population but were defined most strongly by the high proportion of women who fall into this group. The group 
was not really interested in science and science issues and did not think that science was particularly beneficial. They 
also expressed a high level of worry about some areas of scientific research, including the use of animals in medical 
research.‖ (People Science & Policy/ TNS, 2008, p. 7). 
6
 Eurobarometer is a survey activity that measures European opinions across the European Union area as a whole.  This 
survey covered the European Economic Area, the 25 (then-)EU member states (i.e. neither Romania nor Bulgaria) plus 
across the European Economic Area, plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. 
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clearly here, with a very low percentage of respondents feeling that firms were the best positioned to 
explain the impacts of science and technology on society.  This tallies broadly with research that has 
shown that attempts by – for example GM foods companies – to engage with the public has been 
unsuccessful (e.g. The Mellman Group/ Public Opinion Strategies, 2005; OST, 2005). 
―The Government was seen by some people as benefiting financially from science and open to 
influence from lobbying. The example of tax on cigarettes was given (―Why don‘t they just make 
cigarettes illegal?‖). Monsanto was mentioned in two groups as exerting undue influence on the 
Government.‖ (OST, 2005, p. 90). 
Likewise, this survey, along with others, found that there was a broadly positive inclination towards the 
capacity of science to improve society, and that scientific values were not felt to conflict too closely 
with personal values.  The OST/ Wellcome Survey (2000) found that three-quarters of respondents 
were ‗amazed by the achievements of science‘ (p.5).  The Eurobarometer Survey asked a number of 
questions which went directly to the root of whether there was (broadly speaking) a clash between 
public values and what might be considered as scientific values (qv), and whilst a majority of EU 
respondents felt that science made life change too fast, that majority of regret was not replicated in the 
UK.  Likewise, for the three other questions regarding personal values, the UK scored strongly 
oriented towards science in comparison with other countries surveyed. 
Table 2 European and UK attitudes indicating fit between personal and scientific values 
Question  EU 25  UK  
Science makes our ways of life change too fast 60% 45% 
We depend too much on science and not enough on faith 40% 35% 
In my daily life, it is not important to know about science  37% 39% 
Some numbers are especially lucky for some people 37% 29% 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2005 
Inter alia the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (STSC, 2001) noted a problem in 
terms of the general culture of public openness of scientific decision-making.  The real problem 
appeared to lie not in quotidian grant-making decisions, but in the way that scientific information was 
translated into policy-making.  Stein (2003) highlighted substantive problems in the UK in specific 
cases where public consultation had been subordinated to expert scientific advice. Despite the 
consultation taking place, it in fact modified very little the way the government took that advice.  This 
fits with findings in the UK and Europe that (Eurobarometer, 2005; Rayner, 2006) it is often politicians 
who are the least trusted to speak authoritatively. In the Eurobarometer survey, 6% feel that politicians 
and 5% the government are well equipped to talk about the impacts of science and technology on 
society, ahead of only the military (2%) and religious leaders (2%).  STSC noted a particular culture of 
secrecy in the UK, not found in countries such as Denmark, creating a presumption against public 
policy process involvement.  Nevertheless, high-profile failures of secrecy drove a policy-maker‘s 
desire to increase public involvement to improve acceptance for particular policy interventions.  
Rayner characterised this not as a crisis of trust, but rather a crisis of governance (Wilsdon et al., 
2006).   
Despite Healey (2005) noting a risk in polarising ‗science‘ and ‗the public‘, thereby downplaying the 
extremely good connections and overlaps between these two groups, Collins & Evans (2003) argue 
that despite some dissolution of the qualifying criteria for what is an expert, on a practical level there is 
still a need for boundaries to be drawn in the interests of manageability of scientific governance.  
Durant (2008) argued that there had been an overstating of the power of publics to engage with 
science out of a desire to portray academics as inflexible and unwilling to engage.  One area where 
there is public disquiet by the public is in being excluded from situations where scientists take value-
laden decisions in the application of their research into real world situations (SCST, 2001).   
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2.1.3 More transparency at the science-society interface 
Scientists do have a great deal of interpretative freedom in pursuing science: within the parameters of 
rationality, scientists choose to frame and present their work in differing and subjective ways.  There is 
clearly a demand from the public to be allowed to influence that subjective process, expressed in a 
belief that scientists had a set of ethical responsibilities that came with their rights as scientists.   
Science is conducted and applied by individuals; as individuals and as a collection of 
professions, scientists must have morality and values, and must be allowed and indeed 
expected to apply them to their work and its applications. By declaring openly the values which 
underpin their work, and by engaging with the values and attitudes of the public, they are far 
more likely to command public support. (SCST, 2000 para 2.65), 
In Eurobarometer (2005), for example:- 
 79% believed that scientists should be formally obliged to respect ethical standards 
 75% believed that scientists‘ knowledge gave them power which made them dangerous. 
 73% believed that scientists should be free to carry out work freely provided they met ethical 
standards. 
There are therefore strong grounds for scepticism regarding claims for a grand ―end of authority‖ 
narrative.  There is certainly a degree of suspicion that some engagement is being mismanaged to 
ensure the public agree with pre-determined policy decisions.  Felt (2003) and Collins & Evans (2003) 
both argue that public capacity for an interest in engagement is clearly restricted in a way that limits its 
possibilities to create a burdensome imposition on the activities of scientists that writers like Durodié 
(2003) clearly fear.  The public expect scientists to be open and accountable to societal ethical norms, 
but do not demand that they directly hold them accountable.  The demand is instead for accountability 
systems representing public interests with consultations more than exercises in opinion management 
(Nature, 2004; Wilsdon & Wills, 2005). 
The key challenge therefore is Rayner‘s, of a crisis of governance rather than a crisis of trust, ensuring 
the public feel scientists are held to account for the impacts of their decision on the public realm, and 
that authorities listen better to both scientists and the public.  The examples of catastrophic 
communications exercises already highlighted – including BSE, nuclear power GM organisms – can 
be regarded as egregious examples of governance failures.  These are failures to incorporate and act 
on profound public values, and not as Durodie (2005) can be read to suggest, a failure to pander to 
the whims of the anti-scientific and superstitious.  This underlines a need to consider the governance 
system for science more widely and in particular, to ensure that there are better opportunities for 
scientific communications and dialogue both to achieve more real influence, as well as to assuage the 
public that science is held adequately to account. 
2.2 The changing nature of knowledge production and diffusion 
2.2.1 Who takes ethical responsibility in team-based knowledge production? 
A second major challenge for the privileged position of science and scientists in the knowledge society 
is that there has been a widely acknowledged shift in the way that the business of knowledge 
production is undertaken and organised.  A commonly-used characterisation is of Gibbons et al. 
(1994), who describe these changes as from ‗Mode 1‘ of knowledge production, linear and staged in 
nature, to Mode 2, where knowledge production is far more free-flowing, multi-directional and 
evolutionary.  Their argument is more nuanced than claiming a complete shift from one to the other.  
Rather, their argument is that there has been a tendency away from the linear organisation of 
knowledge production towards a more interactive set of connections in the way knowledge is 
produced and flows into society.  Ackoff (1999) refers to these new problems as ‗multi-disciplinary 
messes‘ (p. 99-101, in Harding et al., 2007). 
―These are complex, dynamic, multi-disciplinary problems that have scientific, technical, social 
scientific and humanistic dimensions … these are precisely the kinds of problems that 
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graduates of universities will face in their work lives, and that local, regional and national 
governments consider to be urgent‖ (Greenwood, 2007, p. 109). 
This fits with the findings from inter alia Kline & Rosenberg (1986) that in trying to turn abstract ideas 
into workable new products, difficult problems will be encountered whose solution necessitates 
drawing on a range of experiments, knowledges and innovations.  Potentially promising avenues may 
become dead-ends, and so innovators may have to back-track, giving feedback loops and U-turns, in 
an iterative and interactive process.  In this novel model, the role of science is no longer simply 
providing inputs flowing into business, but instead making a variety of knowledges available for 
innovators at the appropriate moments. Scientists must undertake a range of knowledge operations, 
including creating new knowledge (the traditional role), storing and sustaining knowledge until required 
(e.g. libraries and repositories), transferring knowledge through teaching and consultancy, challenging 
existing knowledges and helping to eliminate out-dated knowledges7. 
In part, these shifts can also be regarded as related to shifts in the nature of authority relations for 
scientists, from an elitist towards a relativist expert model with many new groups making claims in the 
scientific domain (Jasanoff, 2003).  Bryson (2000) traces how new groups have challenged the expert 
functions traditionally exclusively fulfilled by scientists, including special interest and lobbyists, 
consultants, public intellectuals and lay communities (Benneworth, 2004). The nature of this new 
model of knowledge production is relatively well understood, often described using network or 
innovation system models.  To exchange knowledge efficiently, at the most valuable point in time, 
people build up relationships based upon trust and proximity (Boschma, 2006), which can become 
solidified into more formal institutions (Lundvall, 1988).  These institutions can create strong 
connections between actors helping to circulate knowledge, giving rise to innovation systems (OECD, 
1997).  These systems facilitate interaction, knowledge exchange and regulation between a range of 
partners (Cooke & Picalluga, 2005).  This raises the question of the extent to which this 
systematisation excludes non-professional and non-professionalised actors. 
2.2.2 The risks of inadvertently excluding publics from translational ‘cliques’ 
This apparent democratisation of science brings both new actors into the business of knowledge 
production and application, but risks systematically excluding publics in cosy user-producer cliques 
(Wilsdon et al., 2006). Elam & Bertilsson (2003) see this as resultant from a need to deal with the 
fundamental problem of applied science, namely the tensions between universal knowledge and its 
contextual application.  Intense and urgent interactions can exclude potential deliberate and prevent 
outside stakeholders, bringing their values and societal visions into discussions dominated by a set of 
technocratic needs to implement solutions in particular locations.  A failure to respond to public 
stakeholders, increasing dissatisfaction with the governance of science, can lead to restrictions 
hindering both the pursuit of science and its capacity to deliver wider societal benefits. 
In a sense, the problems which can emerge from cosy, exclusive science-industrial cliques are neither 
entirely novel nor restricted to mode 2 science.  Western Euroepan post-war reconstruction involved 
substantial public investment in science-based industrial sectors as drivers of economic wealth.  
Vanavar Bush described in Science: the endless frontier what Etzkowitz (2008) was later to stylise as 
the ‗scientific-industrial complex‘.  Investing in strategic science in both universities and large 
industries became a means of driving national economic development.  Although premised on a linear 
innovation model, mass programmes such as the expansion of nuclear power in France, the UK and 
Sweden, or water management in the Netherlands and Belgium, actually required incredibly complex 
relationships between universities, government laboratories and industry. 
                                                   
7 The Frascati manual explicitly excludes teaching from science unless it contributes directly to research.  Likewise, the Oslo 
Manual, which defines innovation, excludes eliminating outdated technologies as a kind of innovation.  To be explicit, 
these various activities will rarely be distinct (except where weeding out library collections) but rather come in the evolving 
thinking and practices of scientists. 
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Sustaining these relationships encouraged these actors to ignore public stakeholders.  This became 
problematic as these ‗cosy cliques‘ began to take decisions reflecting very self-interested perspectives 
around wider societal controversies.  Dissatisfaction with these cosy relations led in 1968 to a general 
out-bursting of civil unrest across North America and Western Europe.  As Daalder & Shils (1982) 
point out, across the 17 countries surveyed, one general response was making universities more 
democratic through introducing more elected management positions (cf. Delanty, 2002).  This 
exemplifies the dangers of a growing science-society disconnect based on neglect of societal 
stakeholders. There are clear corollaries for the kinds of societal demands that may restrict the pursuit 
of science in the future if broader public interest is not pursued despite the need for close connections 
between those most intimately involved in science. 
This is not purely a macro-scale (society-level) problem: more generally, publics can be excluded from 
key decision-taking forums, with even well-intentioned consultations becoming opinion-forming rather 
than opinion-seeking.  Wilsdon & Wills (2005) argue the presentation of expert evidence is often 
―performed‖, by particular experts invited to arenas such as committee hearings on the basis that that 
committee is already aware that they have something interesting to say.  There is therefore a huge 
amount of preparation necessary for those without institutional support for their case to be able to 
perform in engagement.  Hagendijk & Kallerund, on the basis of a survey of 6 European Countries 
(within the FPVI STAGE project) note that:- 
―Scientists and professionals often engage in debates in their own specialised media to 
discuss policy issues‖ (p. 166) 
‗Pre-debates‘ can frame consultations, restricting public freedom to influence outcomes Healey (2005).  
Felt (2003) notes a tendency for the creation of mediating institutions to ‗encourage‘ these debates, 
whilst noting that they can play a precisely opposite role, excluding publics from the arenas where the 
‗real‘ debates are taking place.  Their criterion for effective public engagement is that the interactions 
are a foundation for ―further development, namely to build a scientist‘s understanding of the public, 
alongside a public understanding of science‖ (p. 674).  An editorial in Nature in 2004 came out firmly in 
favour of increasing public engagement with science, with the twin caveats that that engagement had 
to be meaningful, in terms of being long-term and properly funded, and that it must be taken seriously, 
with a clear set of mechanisms for implementing results. 
2.2.3 Restoring a sense of openness to scientific decision-taking 
The lesson of the late 1960s was that this perception of exclusion can override any sense that current 
arrangements contribute to rising welfare standards generally.  This again points to the need for a 
degree of accountability and openness by science, ensuring effective scrutiny of the claims made for 
the wider benefits of particular discoveries and inventions, which may nevertheless also have a more 
limited set of losers (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003)8. On the other hand, there is a need for an active 
citizenship of engagement, involving ‗outsiders‘ who nevertheless share sympathy for science‘s 
‗messy practices‘. Wilsdon et al. (2006) argue for a shift away from the Enlightenment idea of the 
‗science as citizen‘ to the idea that of the ‗citizen scientist‘.  These are defined by Elam & Bertilsson 
(2003) as people outside knowledge creation who nevertheless share science‘s primary values, such 
as teachers, museum workers, local authority researchers and health workers.  These groups already 
have their own voices and forums to debate and challenge science, such as practice and policy 
conferences, trade journals and newsletters and collective representative organisations which 
commission their own research and bring it independently to media outlets (Wilsdon et al., 2006). 
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 This ―many winners, few losers‖ argument raises an issue of societal solidarity, a notion which was politically discredited in 
the UK as part of the liberalisation of the 1980s, but which retains contemporary salience.  It is socially better if the 
introduction of a new technology – which has net societal benefits – is accompanied by some compensation for those 
who directly lose out.  In part it reduces their direct resistance to the technology, but indirectly, it reduces worries amongst 
people that the next technological innovation will penalise them. 
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There are two consequences in terms of what is necessary for effective engagement to encourage 
light-touch accountability and societal flexibility and responsiveness. The first is what Wilsdon et al. 
(2006) regard as ―a greater appreciation of the ‗software‘ – the codes, values and norms that govern 
scientific practice but which are far harder to access and change‖ (p. 19).  Participation involves 
understanding of these scientific norms and codes, and this must be learned, either through 
professional training or through participation in the community.  Effective participation requires 
opportunities and mechanisms to ensure that individuals can learn these codes, values and norms, to 
be able to make their own voice heard and thereby make a contribution. 
The second is increasing participation and consultation that happens ahead of science, what Wilsdon 
et al. (2006) call ―upstream participation‖.  The technique of Constructive Technology Analysis was 
developed in the Netherlands (Rip et al., 1995) to facilitate the introduction of potentially controversial 
new technologies into society, demonstrating the efficacy of upstream involvement in the domain of 
technological development (cf. Sørensen & William, 2002). Given the close inter-relations between 
science and technology, this in turn suggests that there may be added scientific value from greater 
upstream participation of users and the public in the production of scientific knowledge. 
2.3 Proliferation of competing sources of knowledge 
The third main pressure in recent years is the proliferation of sources of knowledge and information.  
Part of this is the issue that scientists are no longer seen as a privileged source of ‗expert‘ knowledge 
(Collins & Evans, 2002): there has been a blurring, dissolution, or redrawing of the line between 
‗expert‘ and ‗lay‘ involvement, to the point where the distinction is not easily made.  But the issue is far 
wider, with clearly a distinct issue concerning the ubiquity of information both affecting the ease with 
which publics can be engaged, and impacting on how scientists are able to communicate, and the 
degree of control they hold over their communications.  When Bucchi published his study of science 
communications and the ‗cold fusion‘ scandal in 1998, the growth of the internet was starting to hint 
that this might have been the last of the ‗old‘-style scandals.  With a proliferation of channels and 
forums for the public to make their voices heard, it is likely that such a scandal today would have 
followed an entirely different – and far higher profile – course. 
2.3.1 Much information available, reliance on the press 
With so many sources of information available, and scientists no longer occupying a privileged 
position, there are decreasing opportunities for their voices to be heard in an increasingly vocal 
marketplace.  This is particularly significant given the importance of the media as the place where 
people acquire their understanding of science and technology issues.  The press (including on-line) 
appears to be a particularly source of scientific information for UK residents. The 2005 Eurobarometer 
survey highlighted that a relatively high proportion of UK respondents regularly access science articles 
in the press, alongside relatively low participation levels in public debates and campaigning activity 
around scientific issues. 
The 2005 survey offered respondents four choices for engagement with science and technology 
issues9.  The results for the EU and UK are given in the table below, and the two tables show that 
there are a slightly higher proportion of UK respondents that regularly read scientific articles in the 
press (including on-line), whilst there was a much lower propensity towards attending public meetings 
or debates, with only 3% occasionally attending, as against 8% at the EU average, and with 78% 
rather than 71% never attending a public meeting or debate about science.  This relatively high 
dependence on the ‗scientific‘ press for information (both at the EU and UK levels) has impacts on the 
way that that knowledge flows.   
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 Reading articles on science in the media, talking with friends, attending public meetings/ debates, and becoming involved 
with campaigning (petitions or demonstrations 
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Table 3 Active involvement of public in science and technology, EU-25, 2005 
 Reg Occ Rare Never 
Read articles in newspapers, magazines, internet 19% 40% 20% 20% 
Talk with friends about science and technology 10% 37% 26% 27% 
Attend public meetings or debates 2% 8% 19% 71% 
Actively campaigning – petitions or demonstrations 2% 11% 14% 73% 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2005 
Table 4 Active involvement of public in science and technology, UK respondents, 2005 
 Reg Occ Rare Never 
Read articles in newspapers, magazines, internet 22% 36% 22% 20% 
Talk with friends about science and technology 11% 36% 26% 26% 
Attend public meetings or debates 2% 3% 17% 78% 
Actively campaigning – petitions or demonstrations 2% 10% 13% 75% 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2005 
A 2005 survey from the Office of Science and Technology highlighted that across the UK, there are 
significant numbers of people who are multiply involved in science.  This survey defined involvement 
in science as covering ―being a member of a science organisation, buying or subscribing to a science 
magazine, working as a scientist or engineer, having educational qualifications in science or 
engineering, having met or being friends with scientists or engineers frequently, or looking up scientific 
information on the internet‖ (OST, 2005, p. 50).  The responses along with a regional breakdown are 
shown in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2- Public involvement in ‘science’, by UK region, 2004. 
Source: OST-DTI 2005 
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One of the consequences of the ubiquity of information is the proliferation of comment and 
interpretative forums in which science facts, conjectures, opinions and prejudices are blurred together 
and circulated in ways that hinders objective evaluation.  There has been a downgrading of the barrier 
in terms of who gets to make ‗public‘ statements about science (Gregory, 2001), with an increase of 
the framing of science in the creation of ‗stories‘ both by journalists but also lobbyists and pressure 
groups.  Dr Ben Goldacre has spent a great deal of effort in demonstrating how science reporting 
implies ‗conclusions‘ diametrically opposite from the findings argued for by the researchers, in pursuit 
of a story (2008).  There has been a divergence of behaviour away from passive reception (in a public 
understanding mode) towards two different kinds of information using behaviour. 
The two emergent behaviours greatly facilitated by news communications technologies are hostile 
interference and active acquisition. Hostile interference is that public users ignore scientific 
information when it clashes with their other sources of information, which may come presented 
through an alternative lens.  Active acqusition is exhibited by those that pro-actively seek out and 
apply scientific information unmediated by scientific communicators (Wilsdon et al., 2006).  Both these 
trends have consequences for the optimisation of contemporary public engagement. 
2.3.2 Open access, peer review and sampling & selection of information 
Part of the problem is caused by the fact that scientific information moves into the public domain in a 
step-wise process, rather than all at once.  This happens because that allows the generalisability of 
that knowledge and its conformance to scientific norms, and in commercial cases, allows the 
discoverers and disseminators of that knowledge to profit from their findings.  But this is a problem for 
public engagement, meaning that claims may be made for results without the ‗working‘ being visible.  
This can be extremely frustrating for publics, allowing opponents to challenge scientists for failing to 
provide full disclosure.  An unwillingness by scientists to fully disclose when ‗stories‘ emerge can leave 
those stories in the hands of ‗science commentators‘, or encourage premature disclosure of findings 
which have not been through peer review. These commercial, scientific and public interest issues 
come together in a complex way which requires sensitive handling. 
One issue for increasing access to information is the continued practice of peer review, a process by 
which scientific material which appears as ‗authoritative‘ and ubiquitous is sceptically tested by 
reviewers to ensure that it conforms sufficiently to academic norms (POST, 2002b).  Peer review is 
habitually carried out by scientific publishers (STSC, 2004) who use the status of peer review to justify 
charging for that content. Publics may be able to afford journal articles, and resort to non peer-
reviewed research, or to the reporting of peer-reviewed evidence in the scientific press, potentially 
filtered through either pressure groups or the need to create a ‗story‘, to make their judgements.  As 
the Commons Science and Technology Committee noted,  
―We understand that many journal articles are esoteric and, by their very nature, inaccessible 
to large swathes of the public. Nonetheless, we cannot see what damage could be done by 
allowing the public to examine the articles for themselves … We are convinced that it is better 
that the public should be informed by peer–reviewed research than by pressure groups or 
research as it is reported in the media.‖ (STSC, 2004, p. 25) 
The Science and Technology Committee noted a growing movement of open access publishers which 
conform to Peer Review norms, also making their findings open to a wider public.  Despite these 
moves10, peer review is not in itself an indicator of the quality of the findings, only that the paper has 
conformed to a minimum norm of logical and methodological adequacy.  There are implicit evidential 
hierarchies influencing findings‘ generalisability, which publics may not appreciate in seeking to make 
sense of their own situation.  The nature of public debate should reflect that public comparative 
valuations of evidence may deviate profoundly from those common within science. 
                                                   
10
 These make peer-reviewed material available either free-at-the point of access (open access) or in pre-typeset form 
(institutional repositories). 
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The third issue, also raised by STSC (2001) was the increasing mismatch between the speed of peer 
review science and the demands of both public and media.  The peer review process is typically a 
long process (POST, 2002b), integral in improving the quality and the replicability of the findings.  The 
growth of the internet has seen a corresponding acceleration of the speed at which people expect 
stories to develop.  An impact in the field of science communications has come through the 
dissemination of conference papers and pre-publication articles into the press.  In part this is because 
of a demand for timely information, and if scientists have lost their authority as experts, scientific 
publications with a lower level of peer review (e.g. the review of abstracts) have gained authority from 
their capacity to fill this need for timeliness. 
2.3.3 Greater learning in scientific communications. 
The claim can clearly be made that greater engagement will allow the public to form their own 
judgements about science, apart from commentators, pressure groups and lobbyists with their own 
partial agendas.  Yet, there is a parallel tendency to draw absolutes, and to claim an absolute 
paradigm shift in science communications methods,  from Public Understanding to Public 
Engagement.  Many writers have questioned the extent to which such a paradigm shift can be 
demonstrated, and how far these changes have created competitors for scientists in the public 
domain.  Healey (2005) noted that whilst there has been a partial turn to engagement, it is both partial 
and place-specific.   
―Our argument is not that a new paradigm of engagement has swept across Europe, pushing aside 
the old emphasis on innovation and economic competition. Although interesting social experiments 
in engagement have taken place, it is not plausible to suggest that these have replaced more 
familiar modes of governance and institutional action. In any case, significant debate still surrounds 
the form and effectiveness of such experiments.‖ 
Much discourse arguing that alternative modes of communications are replacing science 
communications is very deterministic, and assumes a radical future of which current trends are merely 
the first signs of a wider, totalising change.  Although there are a proliferation of information sources 
on the internet, the extent to which they genuinely influence public values have almost certainly been 
overstated, because of the relatively low levels of exposure to information about science from 
whatever source (cf. 2.3.1) and with low levels of active interest in scientific questions. 
POST (2001), Healey (2005) and Elam & Bertilsson (2003) agree that scientific communications 
remains important to present information to the public.  Given the relatively low proportion of the 
population actively interested in science issues, scientists need to be proactive in making material 
involved.  However, these authors also agree that scientists and the public need also to be engaged in 
a co-learning process about the potential of and limits to scientific communications.  This chimes with 
Wilsdon et al. (2006), that there must be ―a greater appreciation of the ‗software‘ – the codes, values 
and norms that govern scientific practice but which are far harder to access‖ (p. 19).  
Given clear limits to engagement and involvement, including capacity of scientists and publics, the 
issue of public engagement remains at a relatively experimental stage (STSC, 2001; Elam & 
Bertilsson, 2003).  Activities are being developed by academics as much for their interest in scientific 
engagement as a topic as in the substantive nature of the science they communicate.  Thus far, it has 
been driven forward by enthusiasts (Wellcome, 2002), and Durodié (2003, 2005) clearly articulates a 
worry that these enthusiasts have lost sight of the bigger picture.  The limits to upscaling are not clear: 
there are interesting experiments in a wide range of areas, unchanged in form since the 2001 POST 
Report Open Channels, which makes the point that learning at all levels is necessary for effective 
public interaction and knowledge exchange.  The 2001 POST report listed a set of methods common 
in government-society engagement which could be applicable to public engagement by scientists, and 
since that publication, these techniques have been explored in a public engagement context.  In the 
last decade, there have been serious and detailed experiments with all these activities, which 
represent a different level of intensity of activity, in terms of the investments of time and effort by 
scientists and publics. 
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Box 1: Accepted methods in public dialogue 
Deliberative polling 
In a deliberative poll, a large, demographically representative group of perhaps several hundred 
people conducts a debate on an issue, usually including the opportunity to cross-examine key players. 
The group is polled on the issue before and after the debate. Typical costs around £200,000. 
Standing panels 
The United Kingdom was the first country in the world where the government has created a standing 
panel at national level, the People's Panel consisted of 5,000 members of the public, selected at 
random from across the United Kingdom, available as a market research instrument for quantitative 
and qualitative research and consultation. It was set up in 1998 by MORI and Birmingham University 
for the Cabinet Office, and disbanded in 2002  
Focus groups 
A focus group is a qualitative method used widely in commercial market research and increasingly in 
academic social research. Typically, a group of around broadly representative 10 people, are invited to 
discuss the issue of concern, usually guided by a trained facilitator working to a designed discussion 
protocol, typically for up to two hours. The group is not required to reach any conclusions, but 
discussion contents are studied for what they may reveal about shared understandings, attitudes and 
values with respect to an issue.  Typical cost £1-2,000 each. 
Citizens' juries/panels 
A citizens' jury (or panel) involves a small group of lay participants (maybe 12-20) receiving, 
questioning, discussing and evaluating presentations by experts on a particular issue, usually over 3-4 
days. At the end, the group is invited to make recommendations.  Typical cost £15-£25,000. 
Consensus conferences 
By convention, a group of c. 16 lay volunteers is selected for a consensus conference according to 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics without purporting to be representative of the public 
at large. They meet first in private, to discuss an issue and to decide the key questions they wish to 
raise. There is then a public phase, lasting perhaps three days, where the group hears and 
interrogates expert witnesses, and draws up a report. A consensus conference does . The costs are 
around £85, 000. 
Stakeholder dialogues 
A ‗stakeholder dialogue‘ is a generic term applied to processes that bring together affected and 
interested parties (‗stakeholders‘) to deliberate and negotiate on a particular issue (or set of issues).  
Internet dialogues 
An Internet dialogue is a generic name for any form of interactive discussion that takes place through 
the medium of the  internet. They may be restricted to a selected list of participants, or open to anyone 
with internet access. 
Source: POST, 2001, p. 6 (also reproduced in SCST, 2002) authors’ own edits 
 
Durodié‘s argument – that science does not need to engage with its wider communities – is widely 
accepted to be – if not untrue then slightly disingenuous (e.g. Jasanoff, 2003; Felt, 2003).  In a longer 
historical perspective, where science has attempted to divorce itself from its host societies, then 
societies have responded by creating new institutions.  Phillipson (1976) argues that Scotland is so 
well-endowed with Learned Societies (such as the Royal Society for Edinburgh) precisely because in 
the late 18th century, its four ancient universities were not up to the job of providing knowledge for the 
industrial revolution.  In the 19th century, the Universities of London and Durham were set up in the 
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early decades of that century out of a feeling that the other-worldliness of Oxford and Cambridge were 
leading to foregone opportunities for innovation in the UK industrial revolution (Bender, 1988).  What 
these organisations acquired, just as have the new Leading Technological and Social Research 
institutes recently emerging across OECD member states, is an impetus and dynamism, leaving the 
older institutions in the doldrums.  Given the pressing imperative of harnessing scientific knowledge, a 
recurrence of this process – the establishment of new scientific institutions to address emerging 
societal needs – would appear to represent a huge repetition of effort with significant opportunity 
costs, requiring better engagement by existing institutions. 
2.4 The democratic deficit in contemporary political societies 
2.4.1 A shift from politics to post-politics. 
The final issue facing scientists is part of a widely acknowledged change in the nature of the way 
decisions are taken within society, and the relation between the individual and wider power structures, 
most notably political parties.  In response to the increasing complexity of societal problems (cf. 
Ackoff, 1999), and the range of competing potential policy measures, governments involve wide 
numbers of stakeholders in developing policy solutions (Kickert et al., 1997).  Rhodes (1997) 
characterises this as a shift from government in hierarchies towards governance in networks, away 
from top-down edicts towards more collective, negotiated and discussed solutions.  In 2.2, we have 
already explored the impacts that this has had on the nature of the ‗expert scientist‘, shifting from 
being the expert to holding one of many views which must be considered. 
Under the former model of governments in hierarchies, democratic governments were distinguished 
by their technological and political capacity to deliver policy solutions.  Where this did not happen (for 
example in the French Fourth republic), it produced political crises which in turn led to both political 
and technological modernisation (Allum, 1995).  Leach (2002) notes that the crisis in government – 
and its response in a shift to governance – threatened traditional societal structures which bridge 
between periodic voting and quotidian political decisions, namely membership associations which may 
be corporatist, party political, or trade union.  Actors within these structures gain powers concomitant 
both with their respective constituency or membership size, but also in negotiation as actors attempt to 
solve societal problems. 
Difficulties associated with solving these societal problems have seen an increasing turn to actors who 
bring particular resources, namely knowledge, resources and legitimacy, to the policy-networks within 
which these problems are solved (Andersen, 1992).  On the one hand, universities‘ roles as expert 
and unchallenged knowledge has been replaced by more relativist models of ‗self-appointed‘ experts 
(Jasanoff, 2003).  The corollary of the conjunction of these two issues (the need for resources and for 
a self-appointment requirement for expertise) is that in principal, legitimacy can be conferred on very 
self-interested, partial groups that bring either significant resources or the appearance of legitimacy to 
policy discussions.  This closes off policy networks from less well-organised groups, and in particular, 
as traditional structures such as unions or political parties have evolved, publics have withdrawn from 
these structures. 
The effect has been described by as a shift to post-politics, the recognition by publics that they 
increasingly need to self-organise and form groups with independent power and resources separate 
from the franchise to achieve political influence within policy networks.  The effect is also polarising: 
for those that do not self-organise, the gulf between themselves and the political classes appears too 
great to bridge, and traditional democratic representation mechanisms (voting, party membership, 
demonstration) appear ineffective.  For those that do organise, what is critical is their capacity to 
mobilise knowledge and resources around a (the) single issue: the wider context of knowledge 
production, or its inter-relation with other societal issues, is not considered by those mobilising. 
The role of the scientist as independent expert fitted well when the political party was a mechanism of 
natural compromise, where like-minded people could cluster and agree a platform most representative 
of their interests.  Inclusion of scientific evidence therefore was capable of influencing this compromise 
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process, making explicit the difference between ‗expert science‘ and ‗legitimate politics‘.  In the current 
situation, science has lost its expertise except insofar as it endows legitimacy, and can be 
incorporated into single-issue interest groups seeking to maximise their members‘ benefits from 
particular policy decisions.  At the same time, users are less interested in long-term idea development, 
and correspondingly more interested in its short-term exploitation for advantage within the policy 
network.  It is naïve therefore to expect that engagement by science can expect to find a welcoming 
political realm which will bend its processes to accommodate deliberative discussion of scientific 
knowledge11, and indeed may drive scientists towards political activities to secure their own positions 
(Massy, 1996). 
2.4.2 From democratic science to ‘more democratic’ science 
Of course, the preceding narrative about the rise of the post-political society is partial, and it is striking 
that many of the most authoritative claims for its occurrence are also the most vernacular and 
journalistic (e.g. Oborne, 2007).  The reality is more complicated, and a range of experiments with 
more deliberative approach to decision-making have been successfully implemented, such as citizens‘ 
juries (e.g. Wakeford, 2002).  Likewise, instrumental treatment of scientists by politicians pursuing 
politically expedient but scientifically indefensible outcomes have also drawn both popular and 
scientific criticism (cf. Jasanoff, 2003).  There have been several severe crises in the legitimacy of the 
UK Government which have derived from their politicised treatment of science alongside a failure to 
read public values (SCST, 2002).  Rip et al. (1995) are able to point to a range of cases where 
judicious public involvement greatly facilitated the societal introduction of a new technology or 
innovation by addressing societal concerns. 
There remains scope on some level for an idea of deliberative democratic science, that citizenship 
requires understanding of science underlying key contemporary philosophical, ethical and political 
debates (Healey, 2005).  Janasoff argues that given public investment in science, democratic society 
must have some kind of control mechanism. The question is what is that control process, and how can 
this process meaningfully function12.  In the UK, this general issue is sometimes overlooked through 
the veneration of the Haldane principle, that whilst governments set funding envelopes, scientists 
allocate funding, although with Haldane, the cliché is certainly true that it is observed more in its 
breach than its observance (IUSC, 2008) 
In short, governments do invest in science to achieve strategic aims, but cannot not fully understand 
how science produces its benefits, because science is advancing so fast that administrators lose their 
understanding of the science (Caswill, 2001, Siune & Helm-Petersen, 2001).  Governments fund 
intermediaries (science and research councils) and direct them to produce benefits, as well as having 
the power to regulate research actors.  What is actually achieved is therefore highly dependent both 
on the capacity of these intermediaries as well as how those intermediaries choose to frame their 
understanding of the problem.  Intermediaries are in turn reliant on scientists for peer review, and this 
means that it is in fact extremely difficult for government to strategically manage science as separate 
from the interests of the scientists it is funding. 
                                                   
11
 If, as argued in the introduction, democracy is an integral part of scientific ideals, then the ideal-type scientific democracy 
would be one where scientific ideas were discussed, exploited and developed through a process of deep reflection both 
on the implications of the science, and also the desires of the society.  This kind of democratic ideal, advanced by 
sociologists such as Jürgen Habermas, is never completely present, and any kind of engagement activity which assumes 
that society will use its knowledge in that way fails to anticipate the problems which science faces in interacting in 
complex power situations. 
12
 There has long been acknowledged a problem in science policy of a version of the principal-agent problem (cf. Van der 
Meulen, 1998), a particular version of the Weberian bureaucracy problem.  Governments want to invest in science to 
achieve particular aims, but they do not have the expertise to determine what science should be carried out to achieve 
those aims, because scientists are very creative and not easily controlled.  There is a risk that increasing investment in 
science by governments comes at the price of an increasing control infrastructure so there is less investment in science, 
and more in trying to force scientists to comply with government intentions. 
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The previously identified shift to post-politics and increasing detachment between the state and its 
citizens highlighted the need for political structures to exercise control over science to ensure its wider 
autonomy, through exerting some kind of influence over its evolution.  Durodié (2003) sets out the 
reductio ad absurdum of this position, of uninformed citizens vetoing or voting down scientifically-
excellent proposals and choosing to squander the money instead on fleeting fancies.  However, Elam 
& Bertilsson (2003) point out that the vote is only one of the key pillars of a democratic society, and 
they highlight that as far as science is concerned there are two more that are arguably more important, 
namely the right to a hearing, and a right to fair (consistent) treatment.   
Durodié‘s criticism in this light can be presented as an argument against jury trial based on the fact 
that guilty people might be able to persuade their fellow citizens to pronounce them not guilty.  The 
strength of jury trial is that people participate seriously and follow a set of rules, and those rules are 
designed to ensure that people do have a right to be heard, and that their treatment is reasonable and 
consistent.  This in turn ensures that widespread public support for the system of law and order, even 
if only a very few people are directly involved in its application through jury participation.  The 
democratic challenge then for science engagement is to better embody these democratic ideals, 
providing publics a ―right to a hearing‖ (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003) and ensuring a reasonable and ‗fair‘ 
process whereby citizen contributions can be judged. 
The one problem that remains in this arrangement is that the naïve deliberative approach to 
democracy assumed here smoothes away the conflicts which characterise all societies (Wilsdon & 
Wills, 2005).  Political parties were successful in the age of mass participation because they offered a 
‗cultural‘ or tribal structure allowing vicious disagreement resulting in compromise solutions.  In the 
post-political age, an overly deliberative version of science contributing to consensus solutions may 
seek to create deliberation where it simply cannot exist.  Effective public engagement must also be 
robust enough to deal with disagreements and to progress from solutions, even those not necessarily 
chosen by the scientists (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003; Healey, 2005). 
2.4.3 The issue of education and participation in engagement 
Healey‘s (2005) idea of a culture of scientific citizenship seems to offer a helpful distinction here.  
Contrary to the Enlightenment model where only the scientist could be a true citizen, in this the 
argument is inverted that the scientist is only complete if their work is truly grounded in the societies 
from which it originates.   Wilsdon et al. evoke the concept of ‗everyday democracy‘, where citizens‘ 
ordinary interactions are embodiments of and shaped by democratic values such as the right to a 
hearing and right to fair treatment.  As Elam & Bertilsson note (2003),  
―Processes of deliberative democracy can be seen as contexts where citizens simultaneously 
gain new rights of scientific citizenship, while receiving the political education allowing them to 
exercise these rights. Designed in the hope of producing a new rational consensus, PES 
[public engagement in science] initiatives inspired by deliberative democracy resemble political 
laboratories for carrying out controlled experiments in scientific democracy‖ (p.241). 
Elam & Bertilsson use scientific democracy here not in Durodie‘s sense of plebiscites over particular 
research projects or programmes, but in the sense of having a right to be heard.  Durant elucidates 
this point further, pointing out that there are natural limits to public involvement – there are some 
‗publics‘ with good knowledge and capacity to make sensible input, but for others, their participation 
and the hearings they will receive from science and science dialogues will be less constructive.   
―For Collins and Evans, Wynne misreads routine aspects of culture as islands of specialist 
knowledge. Such islands of specialist knowledge do exist in lay public culture, but Wynne 
posits too many islands according to Collins and Evans. The resulting over-population poses a 
theoretical problem, for it makes it difficult to solve the problem of extension: ―how far should 
participation in technical decision-making extend?‖ (Collins and Evans, 2002: 237). If 
participation is to be decided upon on the basis of expertise, and expertise was everywhere, 
then there is no limit to participation‖ (Durant, 2008, p. 15). 
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Likewise, Collins and Evans (2002) call for a need for a clearer separation of the democratic rights to 
participation and the technical capacity to participate.  There are clearly two arguments here pulling in 
two different directions.  At the top level of society as a whole, public involvement in science can 
discharge a critical democratic function, and help embed science more firmly within society by giving 
society authority over science13.  At the lower level, of interacting individuals, there is a capacity 
shortfall greatly restricting active participation in discharging that democratic function, including what 
Wilsdon et al. describe as a ―lack of a shared framework for describing, debating and organising the 
contribution of science and technology towards wider societal goals‖ (p.25). 
This recognises Hagendijk & Kallerud‘s (2005) observation of a tendency for (a) the scientific and 
political arenas to interact very closely, and (b) to collectively exclude the public arena.  How can the 
public become more involved in the public arena given the rising democratic deficit (SCST, 2002)?  
However, the responsibility is not exclusively on the political domain, and there is a need to consider 
how science can encourage people to engage within this large political-scientific decision-making 
process, enlarging what Collins & Evans term ―islands of specialist knowledge‖, and increasing public 
contributions.  In figure 3 below, we stylise this problem of democratic exclusion as publics being 
excluded both by a political system increasingly influenced by interest groups and not individuals, and 
by a scientific system dismissive of lay knowledges despite good evidence they can make a different 
(e.g. SCST, 2002). 
Figure 3 The exclusion of public from the political-scientific decision-making arena 
 
Source: authors’ own construction after the literatures reviewed 
Wilsdon et al. (2006) set out what they argue are the bases for scientific participation, arguing that six 
norms form the basis for public engagement with science.  In the terms of figure 3 above, they allow 
the public to be seen as more than a ‗maundering hag‘ and to contribute effective.  The six norms 
Wilsdon et al. highlight are (capitalisation in authors‘ original) Communalism, Universalism, 
Disinterest, Originality, Scepticism and an adherence to ‗Science Values‘.  Although these are value-
laden terms, they at least begin to sketch out the kind of dimensions along which public learning must 
proceed in order to allow the public to contribute effectively.  These are likely to be currently 
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 The idea of society having authority over science is an abstract one, and is clearly not the same as there being a body or 
institution which bosses scientists about in the name of society.  Society having authority over science is likely to be a far 
more diffuse and grass-roots process, coming through scientists understanding their societal obligations in terms of 
societal norms, and reflecting them in the way that they take forward science. 
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demonstrated in the citizen scientists and cognate supporters, and one question is how these values 
can be more widely inculcated across the citizenry.  One answer can be seen in Wilsdon & Wills 
(2005) argument that expertise is performative, and it depends as much on the presence of a venue at 
which that expertise can be performed, and those performance skills learned. Part of the problem can 
be seen that there are relatively few venues where the public can perform expertise, and learn these 
six norms. 
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3 The stylised facts of contemporary public engagement by 
science and scientists 
In chapter 2, we have traced some contemporary contours of the public environment within which 
science is undertaken, exploring how changes in the wider public realm and society have profound 
influenced how science is done.  Central to these is an increasing imperative for the value of public 
engagement in science.  From a functionalist perspective, engagement ensures that a public sense of 
accountability is felt, reducing unnecessary over-regulation of the scientific domain, and the value of 
the benefits which science brings to society is appreciated.  From an idealist perspective, engagement 
helps both scientists and publics to realise their potential to benefit from ‗progress‘, and to provide 
societal solidarity in taking big decisions which shape societal evolution.   
But in the preceding chapter, it has been made clear that the idea of engagement is not a simplistic or 
straightforward domain, and therefore needs handling in an extremely nuanced manner if it is to 
deliver these benefits.  Public engagement in science remains an extremely contested domain. The 
past paradigm of ‗public understanding of science‘ has not been entirely supplanted by a public 
engagement model, and at the same time, some are claiming new paradigms of publically democratic 
science are replacing engagement.  In this chapter, therefore, we attempt to provide clarity from the 
preceding discussion, by creating a set of stylised facts which describe the current state-of-the-art in 
public engagement, both generally as reflected in scientific debates, as well as practically through 
current behaviours and practices.  These fall under three main categories:- 
 The shift towards public engagement is partial, and within the many modes of possible 
engagement, the optimal balance is very context-dependent. 
 Successful public engagement requires that it is a core task which scientists take seriously as 
part of their work, and 
 The way external partners value and demand engagement strongly influences both the way 
scientists choose to engage, and how that engagement creates benefits for its host society. 
The clear message from this chapter, and this report, is that a simplistic notion of a move to an 
anything-goes, plebiscitary public engagement is neither being advocated nor acceptable.  An 
understanding of engagement is needed reflecting a diversity of activity, a diversity of intensity of 
engagement, a diversity of pathways and arenas, which hang together in an ―engagement ecology‖ 
that ensures the benefits of science for the publics which invest in, permit and fund it.  This chapter 
provides a synthetic narrative on the current engagement situation as the basis for developing of a 
more interconnected engagement ecosystem model highlighting where potential interventions can 
best be made to maximise the system‘s fertility and sustainability. 
3.1 The partiality of the shift towards an era of engaged science 
The first key message from Chapter 2 is that there is no consensus over the extent to which 
engagement represents a new paradigm of science.  Clearly, there has been an issue that science 
communication has been hampered by a deficit model which has regarded clearer dissemination to 
the public as its key goal.  In an attempt to break this paradigm, and following the rules of paradigm 
shift as set out by Kuhn (1968), those involved in engagement have postulated that what is currently 
observable as small experiments in fact presage a future in which public engagement will become 
much more significant to science.  This is used to explain why these experiments are small scale, and 
embodies a prediction that engagement will become increasingly important in the future.  This raises 
the risk that a future model of ‗ultra-engagement‘, which so terrifies Durodié, has been used to explain 
relatively small-scale and potentially unimpressive experiments in engagement. 
This potentially falls foul of a trap of arguing that public engagement is necessary for all scientists/ 
science, rather than making the much more justifiable points 
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(a) more public activity should be engagement rather than understanding, and 
(b) there should probably be some more engagement 
The criticism here is not of the idea of ―more engagement is required‖, rather that in order to try and 
validate ―more engagement is required‖ within a dominant (hostile-sceptical) paradigm of public 
understanding, engagement theorists have invoked a future mirage, which could be regarded as 
―ultra-engagement‖.  This then allowed engagement sceptics to dismiss this ultra-engagement 
perspective and at the same time to argue that the invalidity of the ultra-engagement model also 
means that the current ‗more engagement (rather than understanding) is required‘ model is invalid.   
Figure 4  Visualisation of competing perspectives on the value of engagement 
 
More explicit recognition is therefore needed of the fact that engagement is a differentiated process, 
and the end-point, whilst also uncertain, is also clearly likely to not be hugely different from what is 
currently undertaken.  This issue of appropriateness is an important part of the diversity of 
engagement activity, given the findings that intense engagement by scientists is extremely time-
consuming, and that organising meaningful engagement events across policy-making is extremely 
expensive.  This suggests a natural limit to what engagement can achieve, and following the 
argumentation of figure 4, increasing the communications effort devoted to engagement, without 
substantially raising the overall communications effort.   
The first substantive consequence for the ‗engagement ecology‘ is that engagement activity can be 
regarded as being on a continuum based on the level of intensity of the interaction.  But rather than 
viewing high intensity as objectively good (or better than less intense engagement), high intensity of 
interaction brings with it substantive opportunity costs.  Appropriateness of intensity of engagement 
therefore depends very strongly on contextual conditions.  The circumstances in which more intense 
engagement is required are where there is a compelling case for the benefits of engagement. 
Appropriate engagement is one that matches the costs of the activity with the benefits it brings given 
the particular context (e.g. an outbreak of public scepticism).  An example is when there is public 
scepticism about some new technology which may create a blockage to further progress (such as a 
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ban on public funding on stem cell research). A public debate (very resource intensive) in that 
circumstance may be necessary to resolve that blockage before science can recommence.  Ideally, 
effective engagement would have prevented that from happening in the first place.  But under less 
controversial circumstances, less intensive interactive may indeed be the most appropriate given the 
need not to waste resources.  This is not to say that public engagement is a waste of resources, 
merely to say that understanding the engagement ecology means understanding the costs and 
benefits of different types of intensity of engagement.   
3.2 Engagement as a core task for scientists – in varying measures 
The second issue relates to the fact that if engagement is to be meaningful, and to have impacts 
beyond the realm of science, then it needs to be a core task of scientists14.  This may sound 
tautological, but there are many pressures which may lead to a ‗sham‘ engagement process.  On the 
one hand, strong affirmation of the importance of engagement is necessary to address the resistance 
of many to encroachment in their scientific practice.  On the other, there is a tendency for engagement 
to be framed in terms of consultations around risk, which reduce the meaningful public input and can 
often lead to engagement managing public opinion, of which the public are sceptical.  The key to both 
of these issues is a need for realism in what engagement can achieve, how engagement relates to 
scientific norms and institutions, and the extent to which scientists are themselves already engaged 
with a variety of publics.  
3.2.1 The reality of the engaged scientist in contemporary practice 
It is certainly true to say that there is resistance amongst some scientists to the idea of public 
engagement.  Durodie (2005) classifies four issues which engagement raises for scientists.  Firstly, he 
argues that a compulsion to engage is demoralising for many scientists, whose training has not 
equipped them for engaging with unruly and sometimes chaotic publics.  Secondly, engagement is 
patronising to the public, because of the need to use demotic descriptions of technologies which 
undercut their ability to meaningfully contribute to technical debates.  The third is that it has created a 
new set of agents, the public engagement industry, who use engagement as a means to acquire 
power.  Fourthly, engagement becomes a means used by policy makers for deflecting blame for 
difficult decisions away from them to a supposedly impartial arbiter. 
Together, these facts do not add up to a compelling case against public engagement, rather a 
compelling case against a particular kind of engagement, of the kind evident in the GM foods or 
nuclear waste cases in the 1990s (qv).  These factors come into play in particular situations, and 
effective engagement needs to avoid these four particular problems.  Given that more engagement 
with the public is necessary (Nature, 2004), these factors provide a set of guiding principles for the 
kinds of engagement which should be avoided.  Moreover, they stress that anyone seeking to 
increase engagement has to ensure that scientists understand the benefits – and feel the rewards – of 
engagement efforts.  An artificial distinction between excellent and engaged science can reduce the 
sense that it is something which potentially all scientists might wish to undertake – under the correct 
prevailing conditions. 
There is a sense that public engagement is now unavoidable in science, and so the issue becomes in 
ensuring that the engagement which emerges and is promoted creates benefits for the scientists 
involved.  This clearly requires being mindful of the cost-benefit calculus for engagement (cf. 3.1) and 
avoiding demanding unrealistic ultra-engagement models.  But as an important benefit for scientists 
relates to this ‗licence to practice‘, and discharging the accountability function, there is a need to 
ensure that engagement satisfies external stakeholders desires and demands for scientists to be more 
transparent about their activities.  At some moments in the scientific process, scientists do take value, 
moral and ethical positions and judgements, and there is clearly scope for public engagement to 
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 This is not the same as saying that engagement has to be a core task for all scientist, rather that there should be an 
acceptance within and beyond scientific communities that engagement is important, expected and worth paying for. 
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meaningfully seek to influence those discretionary positions.  But the challenge is for this to happen 
without reducing scientists‘ conceptual autonomy necessary to explore a range of potential pathways 
and to progressively generate knowledges. 
There are no easy solutions to this particular issue, in part because scientists and publics are humans 
with competing desires and interests which are not necessarily reconcilable.  What is necessary is a 
degree of ‗soft coupling‘ between scientists and publics, effectively ongoing, discursive and evolving 
relationships between scientists and publics, related to concrete issues but also scientific concerns, 
which gives capacities to deal with and respond to conflicts as they arise.  Depending on the situation 
- but mindful of fundamental values – through these soft coupling arrangements, the various parties 
interact and create settlements.  These settlements fulfil public desires for accountability and 
accordance to fundamental norms and values, but at the same time preserve scientist autonomy as 
far as is possible. 
3.2.2 Avoiding the pressures to make engagement peripheral 
At the same time as the need to meaningfully address scientists‘ resistance to engagement, there is 
also the need to ensure that engagement activity provides genuine public scope to participate.  There 
is some resistance amongst publics to engagement activities which raise expectations within and then 
fail to deliver these often ambitious agendas in the face of pressing political or commercial 
imperatives.  These are driven by three pressures which come from a variety of directions, risking 
undermining engagement‘s value in providing accountability, and securing an autonomous and 
sustainable intellectual and public policy environment for science. 
The first is that there is what can be considered as an engagement community, people who are 
actively involved with public engagement and are also actively trying to shape the scientific 
environment to be more conducive to public engagement by scientists.  These are spoken derisively of 
by engagement sceptics who imply that there is a trade-off between good science and good 
engagement, insinuating that engagement is undertaken by those incapable of excellent research.  
This is a challenging environment: if one side criticises those who engage, then those engaging may 
turn inwards amongst themselves, to avoid and deflect criticisms from other scientists.  Defensively 
segmenting engaged from ‗normal‘ science risks excluding potentially interested scientists who see 
engagement as something undertaken by a self-interested and self-referential clique. 
The second is that ‗cosy cliques‘ emerge between well-configured expert scientific stakeholders.  By 
this, we mean between scientists and the close end-users of their research.  In areas of uncertainty, it 
is natural to interact closely, intensely and privately to resolve those uncertainties.  Working closely 
and privately within self-defining elite networks risks excluding the public from meaningful 
engagement.  If public engagement is only permitted after all uncertainties are resolved, this clearly 
limits the scope of public involvement.  This in turn runs the risk of creating public dissatisfaction with 
scientists‘ responsibility and openness, and could lead to measures which substantially impinge on 
scientific autonomy. 
The final risk of segmentation lies in the creation of new institutions for the promotion of engagement 
activity within science.  Although there is a need for particular opportunities and incentives to ensure 
that additional direct costs incurred through engagement are covered, the issue here is avoiding the 
compartmentalisation of engagement.  What is important is in dealing with what Rayner called the 
crisis of governance, providing publics with opportunities to influence decision-making around science 
(on the basis of informed participation).  The creation of new engagement institutions runs a dual risk, 
firstly risk that these institutions will not be where the critical decisions are actually taken, and for a 
range of technical reasons may be unable to influence meaningfully those decisions.  Secondly, and 
more profoundly, special engagement institutions may become a means of shaping, rather than 
reacting to, public opinion, and in fact engender greater public suspicion of scientists and science. 
This stresses the imperative of the human dimension of engagement, and the need to offer 
opportunities for all to engage appropriate to their capacity, for the effective management and 
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promotion of public engagement.  Likewise, there is a need to recognise the costs and pressures 
which engagement bring for scientists.  Engagement by scientists is often a voluntary activity and 
those who engage may require additional direct support for their activities to ensure that it fits with 
their core interests.  But as important as direct support is indirect valuation of their efforts: if those 
engaging face resistance to their engagement from managers, this greatly discourages engagement, 
whilst reinforcing the sense amongst enthusiastic engagers that they need to isolate themselves from 
their corporate or institutional mainstreams in order to effectively engage.  But resistance to 
engagement by managers is not always irrational, and in part relates to the relatively low value placed 
on engagement by its end-users.  There is no realistic prospect of changing this situation by making 
statements about engagement activity: there needs to be a higher value placed on engagement by 
external groups, to which this chapter now turns. 
3.3 Publics and policy makers: partners for engagement in the scientific 
enterprise 
A final set of findings relate to the importance of the demand-side of public engagement, and how 
receptive external actors are to the idea of engagement.  Engagement differs from public 
understanding approaches in being premised on a degree –albeit variable – of interaction with a range 
of publics rather than a ‗broadcast‘ approach.  Under such circumstances, the condition of the 
reception, and in some cases the intensity and value of the interaction, frames what can reasonably 
be achieved by the engagement. In practical terms, this means there is a broad correspondence 
between the thirst of the audience for engagement, and the ease with which scientists can 
meaningfully engage.  Of course, public enthusiasm and thirst for engagement does not arise in a 
vacuum, and it is clear that public willingness for engagement is also shaped by publics‘ expectations 
as to what that engagement will achieve. 
This means that this demand is shaped by two extrinsic variables, namely, the institutional support 
and capacity which exists to allow publics to engage with scientists, and secondly, the channels by 
which engagement outcomes - expressed opinions on public norms and values - are able to influence 
public life (and the policy process).  In practical terms, engagement is influenced both by the presence 
of effective arenas for engagement (with the requirement from 3.2.2 that these are not free-standing, 
but are themselves where key decisions are taken) and mechanisms for the public process to reflect 
engagement.  In the context of the UK‘s highly centralised version of democracy (Hailsham‘s ―elective 
dictatorship‖), this can be interpreted as their capacity to influence the public policy and regulation 
process. As the 2002 Lords Committee noted, 
―It is that a meaningful response to the well-recognised need for more and better dialogue between 
the public and science in the United Kingdom requires us to go beyond event-based initiatives like 
consensus conferences or citizens' juries. The United Kingdom must change existing institutional 
terms of reference and procedures to open them up to more substantial influence and effective 
inputs from diverse groups. Consultation of interested groups is already widely practised in 
preparing legislation and regulations; but this falls well short of both the diversity and the 
substantive strength of formal agency granted to public representative groups to articulate values 
and views in legal and many other fora in the USA.‖ (SCST, 2002, para 5.46) 
3.3.1 The importance of engagement arenas for encouraging effective engagement 
One of the more apparently esoteric findings was the fact that engagement is often ‗performed‘.  This 
does not mean that it is either false or insubstantial – accountability is often performed: a group (e.g. a 
board of trustees) are given oversight powers, and have to demand that the body they hold 
accountable (e.g. a charity‘s management) answer questions about what is or is not reasonable: if 
those answers are not satisfactory, this changes what that body does, and managers may be sacked.  
A supervisory board member may be mandated to express the collective will of an interest group or 
collective, such as the membership or the wider public.  In doing that, a trustee must think beyond 
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their immediate experience and suppress their personal interests, in favour of the interests of the 
group which they formally represent. 
Given the importance of the ‗licence to practice‘ for scientists, and in science reflecting wider societal 
norms and values, it is likewise possible to see how engagement can be regarded as a performance.  
A group of scientists and publics come together and play out particular roles, although those roles are 
not necessarily as precisely defined as in the accountability example set out above.  This means there 
are consequences for effective engagement, in that there need to be arenas where engagement takes 
place, and the rules and expectations of engagement need to be set out in advance. 
A second important consequence is the importance of partners learning to perform their ‗engagement 
roles‘ which may be quite different from their usual experienced roles at a time when those involved 
are very closely and emotionally attached to the subject under discussion – whether science or the 
wider impacts of that science.  The Nature article‘s reference to the ―maundering hag‖ paints a worst-
case scenario for engagement in which the performance of engagement is only a burden on the 
scientist and of little value to the publics.  The key question is what can be done in practical terms to 
minimise that burden whilst at the same time ensuring that engagement meets wider public needs. 
The first element is configuring engagement arenas to ensure that there is genuinely interaction.  
Different intensities of interaction require different power relations between actors – whilst ‗experts on 
a podium; roving mic in the audience‘ is appropriate for dissemination, co-determination of a research 
programme requires scientists and publics given comparable status, both physically but also 
organisationally.  As well as having an appropriate format for engagement events, there also needs to 
be a suitable number of them, and if the desire is to increase certain kinds of engagement, then the 
corollary of this is more engagement arenas.  Finally, it is important that these arenas are not 
peripheral, stage-managed events, but constructed to allow engagement to have an appropriate level 
of influence. 
The second element is a clear definition of the roles which actors are expected to play in particular 
engagement arenas, with suitable prior preparation and support for those roles.  For activities which 
tend more towards dissemination, then roles may be apparently clear, with scientists playing experts 
and publics playing audience.  But for contentious issues – whether stem cells or new airports – there 
may be those that wish to use dissemination events to make their own statements of public record. 
Thought needs be given to how organisers will react to that situation, to be fair both to that participant, 
but also to others who find their own learning disrupted by the deviation.  For more intense 
interactions, effectively defining who holds whom accountable or exerts strategic influence with what 
mandate and representing whose interests are necessary if engagement is to succeed.  This is not 
impossible, and there are good examples – for example from the health sector – where lay panels 
from health charities funding research are able to provide a steer in the reviewing process.  But 
experience and clarity of those roles is critical. 
The third issue, also related to the clear definition of roles in the performance of engagement, is the 
issue of learning by the participants in engagement.  Good engagement performances require good 
performers, and the skills to be a good performer require learning.  This issue relates not just to 
publics learning how science works, but to all concerned learning about how engagement works, and 
how to play their role in the process effectively to create societal added value from the scientific 
activity.  Both scientists and publics learn progressively about engagement activity and thereby 
develop the capacity to engage more effectively.  This is not purely an individual learning process – 
learning takes place in arenas, and participation in those arenas supports the learning process: 
experienced actors mentor those less experienced, building capacity in the system as a whole.  This is 
an additional requirement of the arenas; that they are not closed to new membership, and host 
‗learning communities of practice‘ which both produce concrete engagement outcomes but also initiate 
new members and develop existing members. 
It is worth at this point distinguishing between two kinds of impacts from engagement Firstly, there are 
direct engagement outcomes, which may be a rising general interest in science issues, or even as 
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direct as involvement in deciding which research proposals may be funded by a research charity. 
Secondly, and arguably more importantly, there are developmental outcomes: performing 
engagement takes place within communities of engagers, groups of scientists and publics who work 
together and learn how to work together better, in turn creating the preconditions for a more engaged 
scientific environment.  Designing engagement arenas therefore needs consideration of this 
developmental role played by engagement.  Arenas therefore need to be open to the inexperienced, 
offer mentoring and support to novitiates helping them to participate more fully, and then signposting 
onwards to more intense engagement experiences. 
This need not be a formal or mechanistic process – science cafés may be advertised at public lectures 
and then regular attendance and participation in those cafés may bring particular individuals to the 
attention of the organisers, who can then use those regular attendees for more ambitious engagement 
projects.  What is critical is recognising that this developmental nature means there are relationships 
between arenas, and increasing engagement involves progression from less intense to more intense 
interactions, with the implications that this brings for the kind of roles which scientists and publics are 
expected to play. 
3.3.2 Public interest and values in the engagement process  
It is remarkable in attitudinal surveys that the greatest degree of scepticism was reserved not for the 
willingness of scientists to engage, but rather for chance that that engagement would make any 
difference, not just in scientific spheres, but within the wider public realm.  The figures for trust in 
government and politicians was remarkably low, the OST finding that only 18% of those surveyed felt 
that the government acted in any significant way to public consultations around science.  This is not 
just a problem for governance, suppressing problems temporarily and creating greater backlashes 
later, as was seen in the crises around BSE, GM foods and nuclear power.  This also undermines the 
willingness of the public to engage with these consultations, and therefore reduces the demand on 
scientists to engage, undermining the arenas and communities within which public engagement takes 
place (cf. 3.3.1). 
Part of the reason for the separation between consultations and the policy process is because the 
public policy process is often – in areas of uncertainty and controversy such as those found in the 
scientific realm - conflict-based and relies on a mix of sheer political power alongside messy 
compromises to achieve that power.  Such contentious decisions are at the same time embedded in a 
wider political calculus by politicians seeking both the delivery of past promises whilst ensuring future 
electability.  In such circumstances, tight, closed networks form between those with resources, 
knowledge and legitimacy to achieve a solution.  Where publics can have greatest impact and 
influence in this controversial process is when a febrile public mood threatens the legitimacy of policy-
makers.  By contrast, by undertaking slow, rational and deliberative interaction, diffusing a sense of 
panic and conflict, publics almost connive at their exclusion from the urgency of practical policy-
making. 
One consequence of this espoused by some of the references was to reaffirm the importance of 
science in ‗speaking truth to power‘, and in particular the obligation for scientists in allowing excluded 
voices to be heard in wider policy debates15.  Some have argued for a recognition of the importance of 
‗activist scientists‘ and ‗scientific activism‘ although there is far less consensus around its desirability.  
This is particularly the case with those that would conflate activism with subjectivity in a way 
incommensurate with the demands of scientific objectivity.  Scientific activism also raises a host of 
important questions for those scientists who cannot claim some kind of academic freedom, particularly 
where they may found themselves drawn to raise interests counter to those of their employers, 
whether in the public or private sectors.  There is more ambivalence around the idea of scientific 
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 This can be a tricky and contentious point, particularly around deviant or denialist scientific views, raising the question of 
whether science and scientists have the obligation to provide a platform to views outside the scientific mainstream.   
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freedom in terms of the capacity of scientists outside the academy to articulate ideas that are not 
formally those of their employer but which are not directly contrary to employer interests.   
But the fundamental issue remains that there is a tendency in the public policy process – in the UK at 
least and exclusively in the case of controversial topics – to promote scientists who corroborate 
politicians‘ ‗fixes‘ and to denigrate and exclude those that do not.  It is unrealistic to attempt to change 
the UK‘s style of governance, but what can be done is to focus on encouraging engagement in those 
areas which are less controversial, and in which the public can expect to have a greater degree of 
input.  Healey et al. (2005) read this across to mean there should be more deliberative governance of 
non-controversial science areas, to create a general norm of reflective public engagement which 
creates an infrastructure which can then hope to also exert influence in more imminent and urgent 
policy processes. 
3.4 The boundary conditions for effective contemporary engagement 
In the preceding discussion, some of the contours of the contemporary landscape for public 
engagement by scientists are becoming clearer.  As the preceding chapter is a synthesis of a literature 
review which is at times equivocal, and by no means conclusive, it is important not to overplay the 
validity of these synthetic findings.  What follows can primarily be regarded as suggestive rather than 
demonstrative, a foundation for accepting the model which Chapter 4 will suggest as one way of 
understanding what is admittedly a very complex situation.  One of the less equivocal findings is that 
engagement is relatively novel, certainly experimental, with little certainty over the final end-point on 
the journey towards ‗engaged science‘.  Nevertheless, the literature does suggest a number of 
important issues to be borne in mind in attempting to shift the current science system towards a 
greater level of engagement, even if the end point is uncertain.  The five consequences emerging from 
this chapter are as follows:- 
 The appropriateness of intensity of engagement depends strongly on contextual conditions.  
Appropriate engagement matches activity costs with the benefits it brings given the particular 
context (e.g. an outbreak of public scepticism). 
 ‗Soft coupling‘ between scientists and publics is important, giving a capacity to deal with and 
respond to conflicts as they arise, to interact and create settlements which fulfil public desires for 
accountability, whilst preserving scientist autonomy. 
 The effective management and promotion of public engagement requires stressing the imperative 
of the human dimension of engagement, and the need to offer opportunities for all to engage 
appropriate to their capacity, whilst recognising the costs and pressures which engagement bring 
for scientists and publics. 
 Engagement arenas need to be open to the inexperienced, offer mentoring and support, and 
signposting onwards to more intense engagement: there are relationships between arenas: 
increasing engagement involves stimulating progression from less intense to more intense 
interactions. 
 There should be more deliberative governance of non-controversial science areas, to create a 
general norm of reflective public engagement which creates an infrastructure which can then hope 
to also exert influence in more imminent and urgent policy processes. 
This helps to establish the boundary conditions for a model providing an insight into the functioning of 
contemporary public engagement in science.  There are many activities taking place simultaneously: 
some of them are more intense and demanding than others, but there is no ideal type or best-practice.  
What is the most appropriate type of engagement activity varies according to contextual conditions, 
and in particular there is a strong trade-off between scope and intensity for a particular level of 
resourcing.   A number of things can be said about what makes a particular type of intervention most 
appropriate for a situation. 
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Because context is driven by external as well as internal drivers which may change outwith the control 
of scientists and publics, flexibility in collaborative relations is important to ensure that particular 
engagement arenas remain meaningful for those engaged with them.  All other things being equal, 
well-defined and transparent conditions for access to a particular arena, which are appropriate to the 
type of arena, improve the contribution made by a particular engagement arena. People matter: more 
engagement involves more people engaging, and more people appreciating that engagement is 
worthwhile for them.  Also, as people learn and develop capacity for engagement, this can make more 
intensive engagement more attractive as experience makes it less demanding. 
This background paper for the report suggests that there is insufficient engagement currently 
undertaken in the UK: a positive outcome is for more people to be involved in engagement activities.  
As the volume of engagement increases, this should be reflected across all types of engagement 
arena, from the passive-dissemination type through to involving publics in shaping research priorities 
and programmes – in an appropriate manner.  Because engagement is done by people, and is a 
learning experience, it can be expected that as well as more people become involved in engagement, 
there will be progression of numbers involved (publics and scientists) from the less-intensive to the 
more-intensive types of engagement.  There will be more contact with dissemination activity, more 
participation in science activities as defined by the Office of Science and Technology (cf. footnote 6), 
but also more people with the capacity to contribute effectively to more intense activities.  This will also 
allow public policy to make more use of engagement as it becomes mainstreamed. 
It is important not to present this as a virtuous cycle, as one reading of the preceding paragraph might 
suggest.  Rather, these improvements are underpinned by a set of relationships between publics and 
scientists, between engagement arenas, and between engagement arenas and the policy process.  
The question is how to represent these relationships within a model, and in this report, we choose a 
systems approach, that is to say that relationships between people, arenas, and policy makers can be 
regarded as manifestations of systematic connections between these groups.  Improving engagement 
outcomes then becomes a question of improving system performance, by improving input volumes, by 
improving system connections and connectivity, and identifying and removing blockages in the 
system. 
37 
4 Towards a model of the public engagement system 
In this final chapter, we present a model of the science engagement system which links the various 
engagement arenas together to produce a set of engagement outputs.  The basis for the model is that 
because of the necessity for learning for effective engagement, increasing system performance 
requires stimulating learning activities to increase numbers involved in engagement appropriate to 
their context.  At the same time, it is important not to neglect the external stimuli which impact on the 
demand for engagement, and which encourage both publics and scientists to engage.  Having 
elaborated this model in 4.1, the literature review concludes by drawing a limited number of 
implications for the development of effective interventions to improve the overall functioning of the 
science engagement system in the UK.  
4.1 The public engagement system model 
The basis for the model is that science engagement can be regarded as a system connecting science 
and publics through engagement arenas which produce engagement outcomes.  In this model, we 
classify these engagement arenas at four distinct intensities (as experienced by the scientist, and the 
policy-maker involved with science) and involvement (as experienced by the public), covering both 
attitude to engagement as well as capacity for that contribution.  The roles played by the publics in 
each of these circumstances differ, as do the prerequisite skills, knowledges and inclinations. These 
intensities correspond to the empirical evidence on the experience of the public of engagement.  NSF 
(2002) classes publics into three levels, the ‗uninterested‘, ‗passively‘ and ‗actively‘ interested.  The 
former group correspond to the ‗normal‘ public, the passively interested to an interested public 
audience, and the actively interested to more critical publics engaged in dialogues with scientists.  
Towards the higher levels of engagement, OST/ Wellcome (2002) distinguish (admittedly on a very 
small sample size, 6 classes in a sample population of 40 ) size classes.  Their distinction is more 
around predilection towards science rather than activity levels, but again suggest a progressive scale 
from ‗not for me‘, ‗not‘ sure‘ and ‗concerned‘ through ‗supporters‘ and ‗technophiles‘ towards ‗confident 
believers‘.  People Science & Policy/ TNS (2008) produce five clusters, ‗confident‘, ‗sceptical 
believers‘, ‗less confident‘, ‗distrustful‘ and ‗indifferent‘. We therefore stylise public involvement as 
being comprised of four archetypes:- 
 Interested public audience: active participation in scientific forums such as cafés scientifique 
or public scientific lectures. 
 Critical users: sufficient experience of active participation and command of scientific issues to 
be able to provide insights to the pursuit of research alongside dissemination. 
 Supportive implementers: a good working knowledge of scientific norms and behaviours able 
to improve and provide ‗lay review‘ for the development of science. 
 Key societal pillars: comprehensive understandings of scientific norms and societal interests 
and the interplay between the two, contributing to shaping the most supportive development for 
creative and autonomous fundamental science at the service of society. 
The model is shown in Figure 5 below.  Output from the system comes through the various 
engagement arenas: those outputs are not represented in the model.  The level of outputs is 
dependent on both the intensity of the interactions but also the absolute numbers of scientists and 
publics involved in engagement.  Because of the requirement of learning to develop capacity to 
engage in more intense ways, activity at higher intensities is also constrained by the volume of 
participants at lower levels of engagement.  Increasing output can therefore involve greater levels of 
inputs, or improving the level of through- flow between lower and higher intensity levels. 
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Figure 5 The scientist engagement system as a set of multi-level relationships between science and society  
 
User progression between 
degrees of involvement 
‗Uninterested 
Public‘ 
‗Normal 
Scientists‘ 
Supportive 
implementers 
Key societal pillars 
e.g. parliament 
Interested public 
audience 
Critical users  
Scientist progression between 
degrees of intensity 
Co-
governance 
Conversation Dissemination Co-inquiry 
 
Demanding and 
responsive policy-
makers‘ 
39 
This diagram attempts to capture the learning progression process for scientists and publics involved 
in public engagement (cf. Elam & Bertilsson, 2003; Healey, 2005), from what Ravetz (1999) calls 
normal science, towards the more intense levels of co-governance.  The diagram also captures the 
challenge of Wilsdon et al. (2006) of moving engagement ‗upstream‘, but attempts to break the link 
between upstream being earlier in the process, but to tie it more closely to active participation in the 
‗democracy of science‘ (in Elam & Bertilsson‘s perspective).  The different levels to some extent reflect 
the intensity of engagement in the ‗spaces of encounter between science and the publics‘ (cf. Felt 
2003, POST, 2001), but also the propensity of publics to themselves engage.  For this latter 
distinction, NSF (2002) and Wellcome & Office of Science and Technology (2000) make useful 
distinctions.   
In the model, participants in both science and the public progress along a co-learning journey as both 
acquire knowledges, competencies and skills necessary for effective public engagement. At the same 
time, through making that progression, their engagement has a greater effect by embedding science 
more deeply within the public realm, as well as giving the public more ‗control‘ (in the Elam & 
Bertilsson sense of authority) over the direction of science.  As uninterested publics (NSF, 2002) and 
normal scientists (Ravetz, 1999) flow through this process, so increasing engagement and more 
significant engagement takes place.  The effect of this is mutually beneficial – there is greater indirect 
public control over the science (of a desirable, steering kind) and there is increasing direct autonomy 
for the scientists in terms of the ‗licence to practice‘ alluded to previously. 
The basis for the model is as a pipeline, recognising the reality that with increasing intensity of 
engagement, there are limited numbers of scientists that also have the time and the capacity to 
undertake engagement of this intensity.  The nature of what ‗flows‘ is not purely knowledge – from the 
scientist into the public – but also the people involved in engagement.  As scientists and publics learn 
about the engagement process, and learn how to effectively engage, they move through the system, 
and can develop the connections which allow them to exchange knowledge, the prerequisite for 
effective engagement.  This progression increases the intensity of scientist engagement and the 
involvement of public engagement, and creates the necessary preconditions for better accountability 
and autonomy in science. 
But the model also makes clear that this flow is interactive.  On the one hand, effective engagement 
at higher intensities or involvements is dependent on higher levels of lower intensity engagement, 
producing scientists and publics who are sufficiently familiar with the requirements of scientific 
discourse to interact at with higher intensity (scientists) or involvement (actors).  But the ‗valves‘ 
controlling flow in this pipeline are not only internal to the model.  The amount of flow through this 
system also depends on external connections, and in particular the demand for engagement by 
suitably sophisticated publics.  The greater the demand for knowledge by publics, the greater the 
pressure on scientists to engage in increasingly intense ways, and the greater the outcomes in terms 
of creating both accountability (for the publics) and autonomy (for the scientists). 
This model raises the prospect that ineffective and partial engagement outcomes (e.g. observed by 
Healey) are not merely the result of insufficient effort or inclination on the part of scientists, or a lack of 
insight or interest by publics (cf. Durodié, 2003).  Rather, it suggests that there is not good progress 
from the lower level co-learning processes to higher levels.  This has the effect of them stemming off 
the flow of scientists and lay participants into the higher levels, restricting what can be achieved at 
higher levels.  
We now make a (contestable) assumption that there is less public engagement at higher intensities 
than would be desirable (that is demonstrated in other working papers in this series).  Firstly, there 
are very high numbers of academics reporting public engagement work – 42% (Kitson, 2009), and 
relatively high numbers of passively interested societal actors (NSF 2002 estimating 45%), both 
relatively low intensity engagements.  This means that any shortage in engagement activity must be 
found at the higher levels of the system.  Lots of low level activity alongside an (assumed) shortage of 
high intensity engagement suggests one explanation is blockages at lower intensity levels of the 
system.   
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If these blockages were addressed, and there was more interaction between scientists and publics at 
lower intensities, allowing both groups to learn and develop through the process, then this would 
increase the overall scope, impact and sincerity of the science engagement system.  This is shown 
figuratively in the two diagrams in Figure 6 below, which use the preceding figure‘s categorisation of 
four intensities of scientist learning, and four levels of public involvement capacity. 
4.2 Implications for interventions to improve system performance 
The Science for All group is concerned with increasing the amount of public engagement by scientists 
currently undertaken in the UK, out of a concern that it is mismatched with both the capacity within 
science to inspire the population as well as failing to create a sustainable future environment for the 
pursuit of science.  This review does not have the capacity to test that assertion and evidence base, 
but if we assume that it is reasonable, then a number of inferences can be drawn from the model 
outlined above.  Regarding science engagement as a system of interacting arenas linked by people 
allows the problem to be reframed with a greater degree of nuance. 
Rather than arguing that UK scientists, publics and policy-makers are deficient, the model suggests 
that the UK science system has settled in a relatively low-engagement equilibrium.  There are a 
number of relatively small-scale changes which can be made which will shift this equilibrium position, 
and increase the volume and contribution of public engagement in science.  In this final section, we 
draw out a set of implications for the guidance and evaluation of potential interventions to improve the 
working of this system. 
The first is that central to engagement are engagement activities, the arenas where engagement takes 
place, so interventions should seek to increase the numbers of engagement arenas.  Increasing 
engagement involves increasing the numbers of arenas, both numerically but also in terms of the 
development of new kinds of engagement activities.  Because effective engagement is not peripheral 
or outside existing activities, it would be expected that public engagement would crop up in activities 
from where it had previously been absent.  This growth process would by necessity not be driven by 
scientists but by ‗publics‘ demanding that scientists engage in a dialogue with them.  This would be 
driven by a sense that engagement was a useful contribution to the public needs and interests, but 
was also enjoyable rather than a burden for those concerned. 
The second is that engagement is a set of relationships, and relationships are very tricky for public 
policy to encourage, so interventions should seek to foster the growth and development of existing 
working relationships.  Partnerships – that is to say concordats and agreements between 
organisations - are at best a poor proxy for these relationships, and are only of value insomuch as 
they engender and promote the right kinds of relationships.  Engagement relationships are both 
functional and cultural – they are functional in that parties wish to exchange knowledge, but they are 
also cultural in the sense that they rely on the existence of a particular social milieu, connections 
between people who can work together to achieve an outcome.  Interventions should identify where 
there are good cultures of engagement, and challenge them to deliver more – thereby challenging the 
existing participants to improve the quality of their engagement and the functional outputs, whilst 
affirming the value of their personal relationships.   
The third is that increasing engagement involves increasing the numbers of people involved in 
engagement, and this requires recruitment to activities.  Participation in engagement requires a 
rationale – a rationale which need not be expressed purely in financial terms.  Nevertheless, 
recruitment of individuals to engagement activity – both of scientists and publics – requires a clear 
articulation of why they should engage, and what they should expect from those activities.  What is 
perhaps missing here is a Premiership or Wimbledon effect, world-class engagement activities to 
which people can eventually aspire.  Public engagement in governance is (or at least was until very 
recently) often framed in terms of being a necessary a step on the road to become a Member of 
Parliament.  Good interventions will help answer this question to where is one particular engagement 
activity a step on a journey. 
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Figure 6 Stylised versions of a poorly functioning and a well-functioning science-society engagement system  
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In a poorly functioning science engagement system, despite a 
significant amount of dissemination activity, this does not 
translate into more intense varieties of engagement, with limited 
involvement of publics.  This means there is little user learning 
and progression, reinforcing a lack of ‗pull‘ for engagement by 
scientists.  The lack of opportunities for engagement undermines 
scientist learning approaches, and ensures that engagement 
remains constrained to very extensive and low impact 
approaches. 
A well-functioning science engagement system is characterised 
by high levels of demand for engagement by public partners, and 
providing higher numbers of publics with which scientists can 
engage more intensely.  At the same time, this increased amount 
of engagement increases the numbers engaging.  This has the 
effect of increasing the public sense of accountability and control 
over the broad thrust of scientific development, which in turn has 
the effect of increasing scientific autonomy through a confirmation 
of science‘s licence to practice.   
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The fourth principle is that increasing the quality of engagement necessitates increasing its impacts 
in terms of its uptake in wider society, and good interventions are those which intervene at the 
demand side, and which create questions and problems which effective engagement can answer 
and solve.  At the same time, this helps to bring publics into policy networks as more salient 
stakeholders because these engagement activities contribute to the (legitimacy of the) solution.  
Janssen (2009) describes an attempt by a Water Management organisation to bring river 
engineers and publics together to model the impact of climate change on the landscape of the 
Maas floodplain in the southern Netherlands.  The engagement was necessary after the first 
technical modelling exercise by scientists failed to generate public legitimacy for a set of technical 
but also potentially arbitrary decisions.  Given the huge amount of knowledges that are applied in 
attempting to solve societal problems at a range of scales, there is clearly in the UK a huge 
untapped potential for greater public involvement in exercises which meaningfully influence policy-
development, and good interventions will further drive this process.   
The fifth principle of good interventions is that they support local engagement and help place it in a 
wider context.  Because the domain of contemporary science is so internationalised it is easy for 
scientists and policy-makers to forget that other participants in engagement may not have the 
opportunities and experiences to situate their work in its broader context.  For scientists, this is not 
a top-down process, rather scientists have local laboratories and scientists participate in networks 
which validate and affirm that knowledge as a community outcome, through peer review, learned 
societies, Inquiries & Commissions, accolades and awards.  It is important that engagement has 
the opportunity to be situated in this wider community – and to link local engagement activities to 
wider engagement networks – which do exist, such as Living Knowledge (the Science Shop 
network) or the virtual Science Café network.  Good interventions help support linking between 
engagement activities, stimulating peer-learning, but also connect engagement better to where it 
can exert an influence.   
The final principle is that engagement communities – and the cultures around them – use artefacts 
and infrastructures as a way of supporting and sustaining their communities.  Good interventions 
recognise that it is not just engagement arenas that are necessary but also these supporting 
infrastructures and artefacts.  These already exist at a variety of levels, from the national scientific 
communications associations to local Speakers‘ Clubs which arrange debates and use their 
membership to create an audience or participants in particular engagement activities.  STSC 
(2002) concluded that ―Public communication of science activities is funded by Government 
through a variety of channels, and in a piecemeal manner‖ (p. 5).   Although STSC urged more 
consolidation and funding of efforts, there is the risk in concentrating funding into creating a body 
responsible for engagement that also runs the risk of removing that engagement from the contexts 
where it has the greatest opportunities for success.  
So what might a good intervention look like in practice?  To avoid casting aspersions on existing 
activities which this review has not considered with any degree of depth, we hypothetically 
consider the research networks which research councils fund on the basis of a light-touch 
application to bring scientists and users together at a series of meetings (typically six) to develop 
understanding and aid dissemination.  A similar process could be oriented towards small non-
university organisations (such as Speakers‘ Clubs) who could bring together groups of users and 
scientists.  These activities could define a set of questions they were interested in exploring 
through a set of defined engagement activities over a fixed (e.g. multi-annual period) with a 
relatively short time-scale and with a small budget (Research networks are of the order of £10k).  
The table below sets out how this intervention meets with one single intervention the gamut of the 
necessary principles for effective engagement. 
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Table 5 how an engagement network intervention might improve the engagement system  
Principle Contribution 
Creating engagement 
arenas 
The meetings are themselves an engagement arena 
Developing existing 
relationships  
The application requires an existing network to exist but gives 
the network something to do, namely administer the award. 
Effective recruitment 
to activities 
The organisers use their existing membership to create a 
participant for events 
Increasing uptake of 
findings 
One purpose of the meetings is to clarify a set of 
understandings in a digestible way which can then be easily 
communicated at the appropriate time. 
Linking local activities 
to wider networks  
The award gives the group external imprimatur, and the 
Funder could run Award Holder sessions to stimulate learning 
between groups and about engagement in general. 
Supporting a 
community  
The award is both a recognition of the value of the activity, 
and gives the group something tangible to do and a sense of 
purpose. 
This is not a plea for funding engagement networks, rather to make the argument that what is 
necessary in a time of budgetary stringency is to develop a suite of light-touch activities that build 
on what is already present.  Critically, they also manage to avoid falling into the elephant trap of 
creating new over-arching structures which bypass existing activities and destroy enthusiasm, but 
which also sideline engagement as ‗something else‘ or a desirable extra.  An effective approach 
system management is one which:- 
 maps existing activities against these six principles, the intensity of the interactions and the 
capacity of the participants,  
 identifies potentially gaps in the overall ecology, and  
 tailors its novel solutions to ensure that there is a balanced mix of activities at all levels,  
 which in turn stimulates connections and developments between those levels. 
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